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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Cyber-Physical Co-Design of Wireless Control Systems
by
Bo Li
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Chenyang Lu
Wireless sensor-actuator network (WSAN) technology is gaining rapid adoption in process
industries because of its advantages in lowering deployment and maintenance cost in chal-
lenging environments. While early success of industrial WSANs has been recognized, signif-
icant potential remains in exploring WSANs as unified networks for industrial plants. This
thesis research explores a cyber-physical co-design approach to design wireless control sys-
tems. To enable holistic studies of wireless control systems, we have developed the Wireless
Cyber-Physical Simulator (WCPS), an integrated co-simulation environment that integrates
Simulink and our implementation of WSANs based on the industrial WirelessHART stan-
dard. We further develop novel WSAN protocols tailored for advanced control designs for
networked control systems. WCPS now works as the first simulator that features both linear
and nonlinear physical plant models, state-of-art WirelessHART protocol stack, and realis-
tic wireless network characteristics. A realistic wireless structural control study sheds light
on the challenges of WSC and the limitations of a traditional structural control approach
under realistic wireless conditions. Systematic emergency control results demonstrate that
x
our real-time emergency communication approach enables timely emergency handling, while
allowing regular feedback control loops to effectively share resources in WSANs during nor-
mal operations. A co-joint study of wireless routing and control highlights the importance
of the co-design approach of wireless networks and control.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless sensor-actuator network (WSAN) technology is gaining rapid adoption in process
industries because of its advantages in lowering deployment and maintenance cost in challeng-
ing environments. While early success of industrial WSANs has been recognized, significant
potential remains in exploring WSANs as unified networks for industrial plants. This thesis
research explores a cyber-physical co-design approach to design wireless control systems.
To enable holistic studies of wireless control systems, we have developed the Wireless Cyber-
Physical Simulator (WCPS), an integrated co-simulation environment that integrates Simulink
and our implementation of WSANs based on the industrial WirelessHART standard. Under
the WCPS framework, we have implemented a state-of-art WirelessHART protocol stack.
We have further developed novel WSAN protocols and case studies for advanced wireless
control systems.
Wireless Structural Control (WSC) systems can play a crucial role in protecting civil infras-
tructure in the event of earthquakes and other natural disasters. Such systems represent
an exemplary class of cyber-physical systems that perform close-loop control using wireless
sensor networks. Existing WSC research usually employs wireless sensors installed on small
1
lab structures, which cannot capture realistic delays and data loss in wireless sensor net-
works deployed on large civil structures. The lack of realistic tools that capture both the
cyber (wireless) and physical (structural) aspects of WSC systems has been a hurdle for
cyber-physical systems research for civil infrastructure. This thesis research advances the
state of the art through the following contributions. First, we developed the Wireless Cyber-
Physical Simulator (WCPS), an integrated environment that combines realistic simulations
of both wireless sensor networks and structures. WCPS integrates Simulink and TOSSIM, a
state-of-the-art sensor network simulator featuring a realistic wireless model seeded by signal
traces. Second, we performed two realistic case studies each combining a structural model
with wireless traces collected from real-world environments. The building study combines a
benchmark building model and wireless traces collected from a multi-story building. The
bridge study combines the structural model of the Cape Girardeau bridge over the Missis-
sippi River and wireless traces collected from a similar bridge (the Jindo Bridge) in South
Korea. Finally, we proposed a cyber-physical co-design approach to WSC that integrates a
novel holistic scheduling scheme (for sensing, communication and control) and an Optimal
Time Delay Controller (OTDC) that substantially improves structural control performance.
Recently, we have further enhanced the wireless building control study, transforming it into
a benchmark that can be used by the structural control community to explore and evaluate
different wireless control approaches, allowing practitioners to easily generate and configure
realistic nuisances such as network induced delay, data loss, measurement noise, and control
constraints.
Recent years have witnessed adoption of wireless sensor-actuator networks (WSANs) in pro-
cess control. Many real-world process control systems must handle various emergency alarms
under stringent timing constraints in addition to regular control loops. However, despite
considerable theoretical results on wireless control, the problem of incorporating emergency
2
alarms in wireless control has received little attention. This thesis presents, to the best of
our knowledge, the first systematic approach to incorporate emergency alarms into wireless
process control. The challenge in emergency communication lies in the fact that emergen-
cies occur occasionally, but must be delivered within their deadlines when they occur. To
tackle this problem, we first propose efficient real-time emergency communication proto-
cols based on slot stealing and event-based communication; We then conduct systematic
studies on a coupled water tank system controlled over a 6-hop 21-node WSAN. Extensive
results demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of incorporating emergency alarms into wire-
less process control systems. WCPS and the case studies provide an enabling framework
for exploring wireless process control design and hence represents a promising step toward
practical wireless process control systems.
While there has been significant theoretical advancement in networked control design, there
exist limited empirical results that combine control design with realistic WSAN standards.
We further presents a cyber-physical case study that systematically explores the interac-
tions between wireless routing and control design in the process control plant. The network
supports alternative routing strategies including single-path source routing and multi-path
graph routing. To mitigate the effect of data loss in the WSAN, the control design integrates
an observer based on an Extended Kalman Filter, a model predictive controller and an ac-
tuator buffer of recent control inputs. We observe sensing and actuation can have different
levels of resilience to packet loss under this network control design. We then propose a flexi-
ble routing approach where the routing strategy for sensing and actuation can be configured
separately. Finally, we show that an asymmetric routing configuration with different rout-
ing strategies for sensing and actuation can effectively improve control performance under
significant packet loss.
3
To summarize, the main contributions of this thesis are four-fold: (1) WCPS is the first
simulator that features both linear and nonlinear physical plant models, state-of-art Wire-
lessHART stack, and realistic wireless network characteristics. (2) Our wireless structural
control study sheds light on the challenges of WSC and the limitations of a traditional struc-
tural control approach under realistic wireless conditions. (3) Results in wireless emergency
control demonstrates our real-time emergency communication approach enables timely emer-
gency handling, while allowing regular feedback control loops to effectively share resources
in WSANs during normal operations. (4) The wireless routing and control study further
highlights the importance of the co-design approach of wireless networks and control.
4
Chapter 2
Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator
This chapter describes the design and implementation of WCPS [1].
2.1 Introduction
Since deployments of large-scale wireless control systems are costly and not always feasi-
ble, wireless control systems have mostly been evaluated using wireless sensors installed
on small lab structures. Unfortunately, such networks cannot capture the delays and data
loss in wireless sensor networks deployed on real-world industrial environments. As such,
there is a critical need for simulation tools and case studies that realistically model wireless
characteristics and the plant dynamics.
There have been a number of wireless control simulators in the literature. However, most
of them either suffer from the simplistic wireless radio model or the lack of a comprehensive
protocol stack following real standards.
Truetime [20] is a well established control system simulator that enables holistic studies of
CPU scheduling, communication and control algorithms. While Truetime supports wirelss
networks, its wireless models are relatively simple and do not capture complex properties
5
of wireless sensor networks such as probabilistic and bursty packet receptions and irregular
radio properties [71]. In addition, Truetime implements wireless models within Simulink.
While a native implementation may improve efficiency, it cannot leverage existing wireless
simulators that implement sophisticated wireless models.
NCSWT [29] is a recent simulator for wireless cyber-physical systems. Instead of imple-
menting wireless simulations natively, it integrates with the NS-2 simulator with support
for wireless networks. While WCPS shares a similar federated approach to incorporate an
existing wireless simulator, we choose to integrate WCPS with TOSSIM [43] which features
a more realistic wireless sensor network model than NS-2. Despite its wide adoption as
a network simulator, the wireless models in NS-2 suffers from being incapable of captur-
ing the probabilistic and irregular packet receptions that are common in low-power wireless
networks.
Gisoo in [12] is a recent simulator for wireless control systems based on Cooja, but the
wireless link model in Cooja simulation remains to be improved.
To support holistic cyber-physical co-design and evaluation of wireless control systems we
have developed Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator (WCPS), an integrated simulator for
wireless control systems. WCPS employs a federated architecture and integrated Simulink
and TOSSIM. Simulink has been widely used for control system designs; TOSSIM is designed
to simulate wireless sensor networks based on a realistic wireless link model validated in
diverse real-world environments [42].
In WCPS, leveraging noise traces and statistical models, TOSSIM can capture complex tem-
poral link dynamics that are crucial for realistic cyber-physical systems modeling. Moreover,
the trace-driven simulation approach of TOSSIM enables us to study the impacts of different
6
wireless environments. With WCPS, we have been able to conduct a series of realistic case
studies based on real-world wireless traces, as well as novel wireless-control co-designs.
2.2 Architecture
WCPS follows a general wireless control system model. A wireless control system consists
of a set of wireless sensors, a controller and a set of actuators. The sensors and actuators
form a wireless mesh network connected with a base station hosting the controller. Following
the centralized network management approach of the WirelessHART standard [21], WCPS
employs a centralized network manager to compute routing and transmission schedules for
the wireless sensor network.
WCPS employs a federated architecture that integrates (1) Simulink for simulating the phys-
ical system dynamics and the controller and (2) TOSSIM for simulating the wireless sensor
network. Simulink has been widely used by control engineers to design and study control
systems, while TOSSIM is specifically designed to simulate wireless sensor networks based on
realistic wireless link models that have been validated in diverse real-world environments [42].
By combining Simulink and TOSSIM, WCPS provides an integrated environment to simulate
wireless control systems in a holistic and realistic fashion.
As shown in Fig. 2.1, WCPS simulates the feedback control loop of the control system as
follows. Sensor data is generated from physical models. Through a cross-platform function
call from Simulink, sensor data is injected to the corresponding wireless sensors in TOSSIM.
Following the routes and transmission schedule calculated by the network manager module,
TOSSIM simulates the end-to-end wireless communication of the sensor data packets from
7
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Figure 2.1: Component architecture of WCPS.
the sensors to the base station, and then return the packet delay and loss to the Interfacing
Block in Simulink through the Python interface. The Packet Collector module then to
extracts packet delivery information(the delay and loss) from the message pool of returned
values in Simulink. Sensor data and their loss and delay are then provided to the Data Block,
which then feed the sensor data to the controller at the right time based on the packet delay
(if the packet is not lost). WCPS utilizes basic API (e.g., the dos, UNIX command) of
MATLAB to do cross-platform function calls.
Fig. 2.1 also shows an example structural model, whose input includes excitation signals to
the structure (e.g., acceleration caused by earthquakes) and wireless traces used as input
to TOSSIM. The scheduler module calculates transmission schedules. Networking schedule
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is then deployed into the MAC layer code of wireless nodes and becomes effective after a
TinyOS compilation. The TDMA MAC layer in WCPS is developed based on the MAC
Layer Architecture (MLA) library [40] and further adapted for TOSSIM under TinyOS 2.x.
Received Signal Strength Indication(RSSI) and wireless noises traces can be collected from
real-world environments and provided to the wireless model in TOSSIM [42] for realistic
wireless network simulations.
In Fig. 2.1, the interfaces between the Simulink model and TOSSIM are encapsulated as two
MATLAB embedded functions in Simulink: the Interfacing Block and the Data Block. The
Interfacing Block extracts delay and loss information from TOSSIM messages, and the Data
Block decides what data will be used for discrete control during each sampling period. The
federated architecture of WCPS provides great flexibilities to incorporate different physical
models and implement alternative scheduling-control approaches.
2.3 Implementation
This sections first gives an overview of the WCPS implementation and further presents key
WirelessHART components. We focus on architectural concepts here, and we refer interested
users to http://wcps.cse.wustl.edu for more technical details.
We have updated WCPS to version 2.0 by implementing a WirelessHART protocol stack
comprised of multi-channel communication, reliable Graph Routing and Dedicated/Shared
time slotting supported by a robust Finite Sate Machine, and a centralized TDMA sched-
uler. Moreover, to accurately simulate aperiodic events, we have reorganized the simulator
architecture to support event-driven co-simulation between TOSSIM and Simulink.
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Under the new co-simulation architecture, TOSSIM is configured as a TCP/IP server that
simulates the WSAN. Control models in Simulink connects to the TOSSIM server as a
socket client. Since TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator, ideally 107 event ticks(time
steps) corresponds to 1ms in our co-simulation, each client call from Simulink will advance
TOSSIM by 10ms1. Configuring TOSSIM as a background server process allows effective
data exchange between TOSSIM and Simulink while preserving all system states across
client calls. To our knowledge, WCPS is the first simulator that can simulate high-fidelity
interaction between TOSSIM and Simulink.
As the WirelessHART standard is gaining widespread adoption in process industries, it is im-
portant to study wireless control systems based on WirelessHART networks. As an integral
part of WCPS 2.0, we have implemented a WirelessHART protocol stack in the TOSSIM sim-
ulator. Our WirelessHART stack realizes WirelessHART protocols at the routing and MAC
layers, extends the TOSSIM link model to support multiple channels, and also implements
a centralized network manager with a routing algorithm and transmission scheduler.
2.3.1 Centralized Scheduler
We have implemented a centralized network manager including a graph routing algorithm
and a transmission scheduler. The transmission scheduler generates a superframe consisting
of a sequence of time slots, each assigned a set of transmissions to occur on different channels.
At run time the schedule is used in a cyclic fashion, repeating the superframe after reaching
the end of the schedule.
1In practice, 10ms corresponds to 97656250 TOSSIM ticks, because 1K stands for 1024 in the adopted
32KHz alarm clock and hence 320 alarms (i.e., 10ms, 320/32KHz) lasts shorter than 108 ticks.
10
2.3.2 Multi-channel Communication
The original TOSSIM wireless model only supports a single channel. A key feature of
WirelessHART is exploiting spectrum diversity by utilizing multiple channels supported
by IEEE 802.15.4 radios. To support WirelessHART networks, we extend the TOSSIM
simulator to support communication over multiple channels. The extended TOSSIM in
WCPS 2.0 now can accept wireless signal and noise traces of multiple channels simultaneously
and use them as inputs for simulations of wireless communication over multiple channels
within a same time slot.
2.3.3 Graph Routing
WirelessHART supports two types of routing, Source Routing and Graph Routing, the latter
of which is desirable for reliable communications. Source Routing provides a single route for
each sensor/actuator; Graph Routing improves reliability through redundant routes, where
each node in a graph route has two alternative receivers. In Graph Routing, two dedicated
slots are first allocated for transmissions to the primary receiver, followed by a shared slot
for the retransmission to the alternative receiver.
While WCPS 1.0 only supported Source Routing, we have implemented Graph Routing in
TOSSIM for WCPS 2.0. This new routing approach enables us to explore reliable commu-
nication for wireless control systems. Further, we have implemented a robust Finite State
Machine(FSM, see Fig. 2.2) that runs in the MAC layer of wireless sensors, which supports
execution of Graph Routing, dynamic channel hopping, and TDMA schedules.
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Figure 2.2: Finite State Machine for Wireless Sensors
2.3.4 Dedicated/Shared Slots
We implement both dedicated and shared slots at the MAC layer. In a dedicated slot, only
one transmission is allowed on a same channel; in contrast, multiple transmissions can be
scheduled in a same channel to contend in a shared slot. As in Fig. 2.2, in a dedicated slot,
the owner does TDMA Send without channel assessment. On the other hand, CSMA with
Random Backoff (CSMA-RB) is used in shared time slots, when different sensors compete
for the transmission opportunity. TDMA Send and CSMA-RB can provide basic supports
for WirelessHART communications.
We further devise CSMA Permanent Backoff (CSMA-PB) to support Slot Stealing. Sensors
that send packets with CSMA-PB will permanently cease any transmission attempt within
a slot when energy of others has been detected. That is, during Slot Stealing, owner will
12
send a packet at the very beginning of the slot while the stealer will do channel assessment
with an offset, followed by a backoff if channel is not clean, or a transmission otherwise.
2.4 Summary
In sum, WCPS for the first time enables both realistic wireless simulations and state-of-
art WirelessHART protocol stack. Moreover, in-depth realistic Cyber-Physical co-designs
and case studies are made possible by WCPS, which we show in the following chapters.
More details about WCPS (including user manual, documentation and the source code) are
available at http://wcps.cse.wustl.edu.
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Chapter 3
Realistic Case Studies for Wireless
Structural Control
3.1 Introduction
Wireless Structural Control (WSC) is a promising cyber-physical system technology for pro-
tecting our civil infrastructure in the event of earthquakes and other natural disasters. A
WSC system employs a feedback control loop to control the dynamic response of a civil
structure based on sensor data collected through wireless sensor networks [48]. As a repre-
sentative example of cyber-physical systems, a WSC system requires holistic system designs
that crosscut cyber (wireless and control) and physical (structural dynamics) components.
Since hardware deployments on large civil structures are costly and labor intensive [44,
59], to date WSC systems have mostly been evaluated using wireless sensors installed on
small lab structures. Unfortunately, such networks cannot capture the delays and data loss
in wireless sensor networks deployed on large civil structures in real-world environments.
There is a critical need for simulation tools and case studies that realistically model wireless
characteristics and the structural dynamics of WSC systems.
14
To meet this challenge in WSC research, we have developed a simulator specifically de-
signed to support realistic simulations of wireless cyber-physical systems. Specifically, the
contributions of this chapter are three-fold:
• First, we describe the Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator(WCPS), an integrated en-
vironment that combines realistic simulations of both wireless sensor networks and
structures. WCPS integrates Simulink and TOSSIM, a state-of-the-art sensor network
simulator featuring a realistic wireless model seeded by real-world wireless traces.
• Second, we present two realistic case studies each matching a structural model with
wireless traces collected from real-world environments. The building study combines a
benchmark building model and wireless traces collected from a multi-story building.
The bridge study combines the structural model of the Cape Girardeau Bridge over
the Mississippi River and wireless traces collected from a similar bridge (the Jindo
Bridge) in South Korea. These case studies shed lights on the challenges of WSC and
the limitations of traditional structural control approaches.
• Finally, we propose a cyber-physical co-design approach to WSC that integrates a
holistic scheduling scheme (including sensing, communication and control) and an Op-
timal Time Delay Controller (OTDC), which substantially improves structural control
performance in the presence of wireless communication delay and packet loss.
While this chapter focuses on WSC as case studies, the WCPS tool can be used to simulate
other wireless control systems. Furthermore, our cyber-physical co-design approach and
insights from the case studies can be generalized to other cyber-physical systems, especially
large-scale wireless control systems. WCPS has been released as open-source software at
http://wcps.cse.wustl.edu.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related works. Section 3.3
describes explicit designs of the case studies. Section 3.4 details the cyber-physical co-design
approach to wireless control. Section 3.5 presents the results of the case studies. Section 3.6
summarizes the chapter.
3.2 Related Work
Wireless Structural Health Monitoring(WSHM) research has been active in the past decade [32,
39]. Recent efforts for WSHM include: a distributed wireless sensing system for WSHM [53],
the first wireless system deployed on a tower of over 600 meters tall [56] , a networked com-
puting approach in WSHM [36], a high quality sensor placement study for WSHM [49,50], a
cyber-physical co-design of wireless distributed structural health monitoring [31], the largest
wireless bridge monitoring system in the world [35] and Torre Aquila deployment for heritage
building monitoring [19]. To name a few.
However, close-loop wireless control for civil structures is still in its infancy. While early
efforts developed control algorithms and prototype wireless control systems [55, 76, 77], all
the previous experiments were performed on small-scale lab structures. In the lab settings,
wireless sensors within a single hop and experience no data loss due to physical proximity of
the devices.
Wireless control has been studied with promising results in other domains [13, 15, 16, 57].
The challenge in realistic experimentation with WSC systems motivates the development
of our WCPS and case studies based on real-world wireless traces and realistic structural
models. Our work thus expands the field of wireless control to the civil infrastructure domain.
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Moreover, WCPS can also be used to simulate other large-scale wireless control systems,
and our scheduling-control co-design approach may be generalized to other wireless control
systems. Research works using WCPS yet with more focus on civil structural analysis are
introduced in [72,74]
Truetime [20] is a well established control system simulator that enables holistic studies of
CPU scheduling, communication and control algorithms. While Truetime supports wirelss
networks, its wireless models are relatively simple and do not capture complex properties
of wireless sensor networks such as probabilistic and bursty packet receptions and irregular
radio properties [71]. In addition, Truetime implements wireless models within Simulink.
While a native implementation may improve efficiency, it cannot leverage existing wireless
simulators that implement sophisticated wireless models.
NCSWT [29] is a recent simulator for wireless cyber-physical systems. Instead of imple-
menting wireless simulations natively, it integrates with the NS-2 simulator with support
for wireless networks. While WCPS shares a similar federated approach to incorporate an
existing wireless simulator, we choose to integrate WCPS with TOSSIM [43] which features
a more realistic wireless sensor network model than NS-2. Despite its wide adoption as
a network simulator, the wireless models in NS-2 suffers from being incapable of captur-
ing the probabilistic and irregular packet receptions that are common in low-power wireless
networks. Leveraging noise traces and statistical models, TOSSIM can capture complex
temporal link dynamics that are crucial for realistic cyber-physical systems modeling. As
the standard TinyOS simulator, TOSSIM has been widely used for wireless sensor network
research and has been validated in diverse real-world environments [42]. Moreover, the trace-
driven simulation approach of TOSSIM enables us to study the impacts of different wireless
17
environments. We also provide the first set of realistic case studies based on real-world
wireless traces, as well as a novel scheduling-control co-design approach to WSC.
Actuator
Actuator
Basestation
Wireless node
Wireless node
Wireless node
Wire
connection
Wire
connection
Figure 3.1: WSC System Model.
3.3 Case Study Design
This section presents the design of the case studies on wireless control of a three-story
building and a bridge, respectively.
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El Centro Earthquake
Figure 3.2: The El Centro earthquake as excitation signal of structural control [28] [70].
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3.3.1 Excitation Signal
To study structural response to an earthquake, we use measurements from a real earthquake
as the excitation signal in both case studies. As shown in Fig. 3.2 the excitation signal was
recorded at the Imperial Valley Irrigation District substation in El Centro, California, during
the Imperial Valley, California earthquake of May 18, 1940 [28]. The EI Centro earthquake
last 50 seconds with a maximum acceleration of 3m/s2 at the beginning.
3.3.2 Design the Building Study
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Figure 3.3: Simulink diagram for wireless building control.
Wireless trace collection
The wireless sensor network in this study comprises a base station and four distributed
sensors. Wireless traces were collected from Bryan Hall of Washington University. The base
station is located on floor 3, and the wireless sensors (TelosB motes [61]) are placed on floor
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0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The sensors record RSSI and noise traces on channel 26 of the
IEEE 802.15.4 radio. Each TelosB mote is equipped with a Chipcon CC2420 radio with its
transmission power set to 0 dBm. Our measurements show that the wireless signal of the
TelosB motes can go through at most two floors. As a result the sensor on floor 0 needs a
multi-hop route to send data to the base station on floor 3.
Building model
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4: Building control system [70]: (a) The 3-story test structure; (b) Active Mass
Driver actuation system.
Our building model is based on a three-story test structure shown in Fig. 3.4(a) [70]. The
test structure is subject to one-dimensional ground motion. The frame is constructed of
steel, with a height of 158 cm. For control purposes, a simple implementation of an Active
Mass Driver (AMD) is placed on the 3rd floor of the test structure (see Fig. 3.4(b)). The
AMD actuation system has a single hydraulic actuator with steel masses attached to the
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ends of the piston rod. Since hydraulic actuators are inherently open-loop unstable, position
feedback is employed to stabilize the actuator. The position of the actuator is obtained
from an LVDT (linear variable differential transformer), rigidly mounted between the end
of the piston rod and the third floor. The first three modes of the test structure are 5.81
Hz, 17.68 Hz and 28.53 Hz, with associated damping ratios of 0.33%, 0.23%, and 0.30%,
respectively [70].
We developed a Simulink model (shown in Fig. 3.3) with reference to the steel test structure
at a 1:1 ratio. The Simulink model is designed to simulate a real-world three-story building,
with mapping ratios of: force = 1:60, mass = 1:206, displacement = 4:29 and acceleration
= 7:2, and time =1:5. Since the time scales of the Simulink model and a real-world building
have a 1:5 ratio, the natural frequencies of the model are approximately five times as large
as those of a real-world building. Previous Simulink implementations of the building model
was modeled as a continuous system and a time step of 0.0001 second was used to reduce
integration errors. In WCPS we further discretize the Simulink model and perform step-
by-step simulations with a step length of 1 ms, which corresponded to 5 ms in a real-world
building. As the network used 10 ms slots for TDMA, a slot in the simulated wireless network
therefore correspond to two run steps of the Simulink model.
As shown in Fig. 3.3, the structural response signal is first generated by the building model,
then converted by the Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) to digital values, and fed to
TOSSIM. TOSSIM delivers the sensor data along with its status (loss and delay) to the
discrete controller. The output of the controller is then converted from digital values to
analog signals by the Digital to Analog Converter (DAC). Eventually, sensor data with
control information are fed back to the building model, which closes the control loop.
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3.3.3 Design the Bridge Study
The bridge study simulates wireless control of the Cape Girardeau bridge in Missouri, USA.
The cable-stayed bridge (see Fig. 3.8(b)) is the Missouri 74 Illinois 146 bridge spanning the
Mississippi River near Cape Girardeau, Missouri, designed by the HNTB Corporation. Since
no wireless sensors have been deployed on the bridge, we opt to use wireless traces collected
from a wireless sensor network deployed on the Jindo bridge [35], South Korea, which shares
similar dimensions (e.g., tower height and span range) and designs with the Cape Girardeau
bridge. The sensor placement of the Jindo deployment is then mirror mapped onto the Cape
Girardeau bridge. This approach takes advantage of the flexibility of WCPS to combine
structural models and wireless traces from different (but similar) structures for integrated
WSC simulations.
Pylon
Sensor
Base
Station
Figure 3.5: Wireless pylon sensor and base station placement on the Jindo bridge.
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First Generation Benchmark Control Problem for Cable−Stayed Bridges
S.J. Dyke, G. Turan, J.M. Caicedo,  L.A. Bergan, and S. Hague
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Figure 3.6: Simulink diagram for wireless bridge control.
Wireless trace collection
The Jindo deployment utilizes the MEMSIC Imote2 platform and a total of 113 Imote2 sensor
nodes with 659 distinct sensor channels. Each node integrates the Imote2, the ISM400 sen-
sor board, and a rechargeable battery supplied by a solar panel. Combined with the Illinois
SHM Services Toolsuite [2], these powerful nodes allow for synchronized data collection, ag-
gregation, synthesis and decision-making in real time. The system has successfully captured
ambient traffic loading with peak acceleration ranging from less than 5 mg to over 30 mg.
Further analysis of the data resulted in the successful identification of the first twelve modes
of vibration on the deck, as well as tension forces of 10 cables with large tensile stresses [35].
To serve as input to the TOSSIM simulation, a subset of Imote2 nodes located along deck
of the bridge and sensors on the top of the pylons are selected for wireless trace collection.
With wireless traces collected from the Jindo bridge, we are able to build a 58-node routing
network in TOSSIM for the Cape Girardeau bridge.
During our wireless trace collection on the Jindo bridge, sensors located on the top of the
pylons pose a special case for trace collection. Whereas the sensors on the bridge deck form a
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connected graph, the pylon nodes are isolated. Due to the height of the pylons, these nodes
are outside the maximum radio range of the deck nodes. In our Jindo deployment, pylon
sensors are fitted with directional antennas, which are pointed away from the bridge deck
towards a base station, located on the nearby Jindo Bridge(see Fig. 3.5). For the purpose of
modeling a connected network, the real link quality measurements between the pylon sensor
and base station node are mapped onto a virtual link in TOSSIM. During the network
mapping, as the distances involved in Jindo bridge and Cape Girardeau bridge are similar
and both bridges are in open areas, we assume this network mapping would correspond
closely to a real wireless network setup.
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Figure 3.7: PRR Difference between field measurement and TOSSIM simulation.
Based on the structural model [28] we select sensor 240 and 353 located on the tow towers
of the Cape Girardeau bridge, sensors 151 and 185 at the foots of towers and sensor 34
in the mid-span for structural control. Acceleration and displacement readings from the
five selected sensors are sent to the base station located near sensor 185 using routes with
the minimum ETX in the network. To test the accuracy of the TOSSIM simulation, we
implement a test application in TOSSIM and compare the Packet Reception Ratio (PRR)
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of the simulation with that from the field test in Jindo. Fig. 3.7 plots the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of the PRR difference between the field measurements and the
TOSSIM simulations for all 467 wireless links. Of all the wireless links, over 85% of them
have the same PRR in the field measurements and the simulation, indicating TOSSIM can
deliver high fidelity link simulations based on real-world traces.
Bridge model
A high-fidelity Cape Girardeau bridge model (see Fig. 3.8(b)) was incorporated in WCPS for
bridge control. A linear evaluation model was used for evaluation of the benchmark bridge
model. However, the stiffness matrices used in this linear model are those of the structure
determined through a nonlinear static analysis corresponding to the deformed state of the
bridge with dead loads. Experimental study indicates that the longitudinal direction of the
bridge is most destructive [28].
For control purposes the joints between the tower and the deck are disconnected and replaced
by the control devices. As expected, the frequencies of this model are much lower than those
of the nominal bridge model after incorporating the control device. The first ten frequencies
of this second model are 0.1618, 0.2666, 0.3723, 04545, 0.5015, 0.5650, 0.6187, 0.6486, 0.6965,
and 0.7094 Hz [28].
Fig. 3.6 shows the block diagram of the wireless bridge control system. Similar to the build-
ing control, the structural response of the bridge will go through ADC, a wireless network
simulated in TOSSIM, and a discrete state estimator. The control inputs are converted by
DAC to analog signals sent to the actuator.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.8: Cape Girardeau model in WCPS: (a) the Cape Girardeau bridge; (b) Simulink
model of the Cape Girardeau bridge [28].
3.4 Wireless Control Approaches
We implement and compare two alternative control approaches to WSC. Instead of iso-
lating the designs of the control algorithm and wireless sensor networks, we study holis-
tic cyber-physical co-designs that integrate control algorithms and scheduling strategies for
data collection, communication and utilization. As a baseline design the first approach in-
tegrates a traditional structural control algorithm called the Sample Controller (SC) [70]
and a scheduling strategy that minimizes sensing delays. The second approach integrates
the Optimal Time Delay Controller (OTDC) [26] and a novel scheduling strategy that lead
to uniform sensing delays. Note that both SC and OTDC controllers were originally de-
signed for wired structural control. Our work provides the first case studies of these control
algorithms when applied to wireless structural control.
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3.4.1 Sample Controller
SC employs the Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimal control algorithm [70]. LQG is
a combination of linear quadratic estimator (LQE) and linear quadratic regulator (LQR).
The cost function to be minimized in SC is defined in Equation 3.1, where xr is the reduced
states vector, u is the control force, CZr and D
Z
r are system matrices for the regulated output
vector, and Q and R are weighting matrices. More details of SCc can be found in [70]
and [28] .
J = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
E
[∫ τ
0
{(
CZr x
r +DZr u
)T
Q
(
CZr x
r +DZr u
)
+uTRu
}
(dt)
] (3.1)
Specifically for SC, we implement a Sequential Scheduler (SS) which schedule one packet each
TDMA time slot. Key data utilization mechanism for SS is to transmit the latest available
data. For example, given vector [yx1 , y
x
2 , y
x
3 , y
x
4 ] as the data collected by sensor 1, 2, 3, 4 at
the beginning of slot x, sensor 3 at the beginning of slot 2 (see Fig. 3.9) chooses to transmit
y23 instead of y
1
3 because y
2
3 is the latest reading. Similarly, sensor 2 chooses to transmit y
3
2
at the starting point of slot 3 because y32 is the most up-to-date reading. SS makes sure that
only latest sensor data is used for control, but it also sacrifices sensing synchronizations.
Fig. 3.9 illustrates working mechanism of SC and SS with a four-sensor network example.
Sensor 1, 2, 3, 4 are located on floor 1, 2, 3, 4 of a building while the base station is located
on the 4th floor. Since sensor 4, 3, and 2 have 1-hop distance to the base station, each
needs one time slot to its data to the base station, while sensor 1 needs two because it is
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Figure 3.9: Example of baseline SC controller with Sequential Scheduler.
two hop away from the base station. SC control (denoted by dark arrows in Fig. 3.9) starts
at the end of slot 1 with data vector [0, 0, 0, y14] as only the first reading (collected in slot
1) of sensor 4 has arrived. By the end of the slot 2, SC computes its control input with
[0, 0, y23, y
1
4] because the second reading (collected in slot 2) of sensor 3 has arrived. By the
end of slot 3, SC uses [0, y32, y
2
3, y
1
4] to compute its control input. The same data vector is
used again at the end of slot 4 because no reading from sensor 1 has arrived yet. By the end
of slot 5, SC uses [y41, y
3
2, y
2
3, y
1
4] for control, which completes a communication cycle from all
sensors. Starting from slot 6, another cycle of data collection and control occur using the
same schedule. Intuitively, the combination of SC and SS aims to reduce the delay of the
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sensor data used for control. Henceforth, we refer to the control scheme combining SC and
SS as SC for simplicity.
3.4.2 Optimal Time Delay Controller
OTDC [26] was originally designed for constant-delay system as shown in Equation 3.2,
where l is the time delay. OTDC is designed to minimize the cost function J by selecting an
optimal control force pd in Equation 3.3. However, in a wireless sensor network data from
different sensors will be delivered to the controller at different delays. To use OTDC to WSC
effectively we design a novel scheduling strategy called the Uniform Delay Scheduler (UDS)
that pushes sensor data to the controller at uniform delays.
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Figure 3.10: Example of OTDC-1 with UDS scheduler.
z [k + 1] = Az [k] +Bpd [k − l] (3.2)
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Fig. 3.10 illustrates the schedule produced by UDS for the same four-sensor example used
in the last subsection. UDS first buffers one batch of data (five readings for each sensor).
Afterwards, a cycle of five time slots is used to deliver the batched data to the base station.
By the end of slot 10, OTDC starts with data vector [y11, y
1
2, y
1
3, y
1
4], followed by [y
2
1, y
2
2, y
2
3, y
2
4]
in the next time slot, and [y31, y
3
2, y
3
3, y
3
4] in the time slot after. This pattern continues till
the end of slot 14. In time slot 15 OTDC starts a new cycle and uses [y61, y
6
2, y
6
3, y
6
4] by
the end of time slot 15. Under UDS data from different sensors shares a uniform network
delay (10 time slots, or 100 ms in Fig. 3.10). UDS therefore trades one cycle of delay for
uniform delays among sensors. This feature makes UDS particularly suitable for OTDC
specifically designed for systems with constant delays. As shown in our case studies this
scheduling-control co-design approach leads to an effective WSC system.
J |pd =
∞∑
k=l
(
zTd [k]Qzd (k) + pd
T [k − l]Rpd [k − l]
)
(3.3)
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Figure 3.11: Example of OTDC-2 with UDS scheduler.
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Another challenge introduced by wireless networks is packet loss. Since the basic version
of UDS described above schedules only one transmission attempt for each sensor reading, a
packet drop means losing one batch of readings (e.g., 5 readings in Fig. 3.10). To deal with
packet loss we extend UDS to support multiple transmissions per sensor reading. Henceforth
we use OTDC-k to denote a design that integrates OTDC and UDS that transmit each
sensor reading k times. Due to the limited bandwidth of wireless sensor networks, OTDC-k
retransmit sensor data from earlier cycles by merging them into packets of later cycles. The
simple packet-merging mechanism in OTDC-2 avoids costly retransmissions of entire packets
(e.g., as in WirlessHART). The number of batches that can be merged into a packet merging
is limited by the packet payload size, e.g., over 100 bytes for IEEE 802.15.4 packets.
For example, in Fig. 3.11, though the batch of data [y11, y
2
1, y
3
1, y
4
1, y
5
1] from sensor 1 may be
available by the end of slot 10, OTDC-2 waits for one more cycle (five time slots) before
pushing the sensor data to the controller. At the same time [y11, y
2
1, y
3
1, y
4
1, y
5
1] is merged
with [y61, y
7
1, y
8
1, y
9
1, y
10
1 ] and goes through another cycle of network communication. In this
way, [y11, y
2
1, y
3
1, y
4
1, y
5
1] are transmitted twice and thus has better chance to be successfully
delivered. OTDC-2 therefore trades additional network delay for higher reliability, while
maintaining uniform delays across sensors. Increasing k in OTDC-k increases network delays
while achieving higher reliability.
3.5 Results of Case Studies
This section presents the results of the case studies under realistic structural and wireless
models in WCPS. In both case studies we compare the performance of alternative wireless
control approaches, SC and OTDC-1. We also study the tradeoff between delay and data
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loss by comparing OTDC with different numbers of retransmissions (OTDC-1, OTDC-2 and
OTDC-3).
3.5.1 Wireless Building Control
The building remains stable under all control approaches throughout this case study. To
evaluate the control performance we use three categories of metrics: resource requirement,
structural response, and constraints of the control system. We refer interested readers to
[70] for detailed definitions of these metrics. We perform simulations using four different
wireless control approaches (SC, OTDC-1, OTDC-2, and OTDC-3). Experimental results
presented below are from 25 simulations for each control approach and each simulation lasts
10,000 control steps.
Fig. 3.12 shows the end-to-end packet delivery ratio of the wireless network. The end-to-end
delivery ratio means the fraction of packets from the sensors that are successfully delivered
to the controller. As shown in Fig. 3.12 Sensor 1 has the lowest delivery ratio because it has
a 2-hop route to the controller. Recall that OTDC-1 does not perform any retransmission,
while OTDC-2 and OTDC-3 performs retransmit each packet once and twice, respectively.
Under OTDC-1 Sensors 1 and 4 have delivery ratios of 70% and over 95%, respectively. As
expected more retransmissions improve the deliver ratios of all sensors at the cost of longer
delays as described earlier.
Fig. 3.13 shows the resource requirement of different control approaches. OTDC-k ap-
proaches (see Fig. 3.13(a)) consistently require less control power than SC. As k increases,
OTDC-k requires slightly less control power. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 3.13(b), OTDC-1
reduces control force by 80% when compared to SC. The differences in control force among
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Figure 3.12: End-to-End Packet Delivery Ratio of Sensors in Building Study
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Figure 3.13: Required Resource for Wireless Building Control: (a) Required Control Power;
(b) Required Force Magnitude.
different OTDC-k approaches are negligible. The results that OTDC-1 outperforms SC in
both metrics indicate resource requirements are more sensitive to data synchronization than
to sensing delays in this building control system. OTDC-k with larger k results in negligible
reduction of control power and force, indicating resource requirements are not sensitive to
network reliability in this case study.
The control performance regarding structural response is shown in Fig. 3.14. In term of peak
inter-story drift in Fig. 3.14(a), OTDC-k achieves more reduction in inter-story drift than
SC. Interestingly, higher k in OTDC-k increases peak inter-story drift. Recall a higher k
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Figure 3.14: Structural Response under Wireless Building Control: (a) Peak Inter-story
Drift; (b) Peak Acceleration.
leads to higher communication reliability but longer sensing delay. Inter-story drift is thus
more sensitive to sensing delays than to data loss in this case study. Similarly, as shown in
Fig. 3.14(b), OTDC-3 causes worse peak acceleration than all the other approaches. Hence,
building structural responses are more sensitive to sensing delays than to data loss. In
addition, OTDC-1 only slightly outperforms SC, which indicates limited impact of data
synchronization on structural response.
The control performance regarding control system constraints is shown in Fig. 3.15. Fig. 3.15(a)
and (b) plot the actuator peak acceleration and Root Mean Square(RMS) acceleration, re-
spectively. On both metrics OTDC-k approaches result in smaller actuator accelerations
than SC. As k increases, we can see gradual decreases in peak and RMS accelerations, in-
dicating that these metrics are more sensitive to improvement of communication reliability
than to longer sensing delays. In addition, the comparison between OTDC-1 and SC shows
that the better data synchronization under OTDC-1 has a larger impact than sensing delays.
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In summary, we observe complex tradeoffs among data synchronization, sensing delay and
communication reliability in wireless building control. Overall the OTDC approach combin-
ing a constant-delay control design and a scheduling scheme achieving data synchronization
outperforms the SC approach that minimizes sensing delay without data synchronization.
This result highlights the efficacy of our control-scheduling co-design approach to wireless
control. Moreover, the design of the wireless communication protocol involves tradeoff be-
tween communication delay and data loss, with each having stronger influence on different
performance metrics. For our specific building study OTDC-1 and OTDC-2 outperforms
OTDC-3. The complex tradeoff among multiple design aspects confirms the importance of
a realistic simulation tool in designing wireless control systems.
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Figure 3.15: System Constraint under Wireless Building Control: (a) Actuator Peak Accel-
eration; (b) Actuator RMS Acceleration.
3.5.2 Wireless Bridge Control
Given the similarities in both the structural and wireless characteristics shared by the Jindo
bridge and the Cape Girardeau bridge, wireless traces collected from the Jindo bridge were
used to simulate the wireless sensor network used to control the Cape Girardeau bridge.
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Figure 3.16: Maximum Shear Force in Wireless Bridge Control: (a) Maximum Tower Shear;
(b) Maximum Deck Shear.
The longest routing path is 3-hop. The results presented below are from 25 simulations for
each control case and each simulation lasts 10,000 control steps. To mitigate large delays
caused by large amount of packet deliveries for multiple sensors, network scheduling in bridge
control adopts an in-network aggregation approach [23] through packet merging.
The bridge network is highly reliable (99% PRR for almost all links with the Jindo trace)
due to the relatively clean wireless environment on the Jindo bridge as well as the fact that
the Jindo deployment has line-of-sight sensor placement and strong radio antennas. As such,
retransmission is not needed to achieve reliable communication. Therefore we only present
the results of SC and OTDC-1 in this case study.
Since buildings and bridges have distinct structural properties, we adopt three different sets
of metrics for performance evaluation. The metrics include maximum shear force, normal-
ized shear force and required control power. We refer interested readers to [28] for the
mathematical details of the metrics.
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Figure 3.17: Normalized Shear Force in Wireless Bridge Control: (a) Normalized Tower
Shear; (b) Normalized Deck Shear.
Fig. 3.16 plots the maximum shear force at the tower and the deck of the bridge. A smaller
shear force is desirable in structural control. SC performs slightly better in reducing the
maximum tower shear while OTDC-1 performs slightly better for reducing the maximum
deck shear, respectively. Fig. 3.17 plots the normalized shear force at the tower and the
deck. OTDC-1 slighly outperforms SC for reducing normalized shear force.
While OTDC-1 did not show significant advantage over SC in term of shear force, it reduces
both the required maximum control power and the total power requirement by nearly 50%
compared to SC (see Fig. 3.18). This result again demonstrated the effectiveness of the
control-scheduling co-design approach adopted by the OTDC design.
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Figure 3.18: Control Power Requirement Performances for Wireless Bridge Control: (a)
Maximum Control Power; (b) Total Control Power.
3.6 Summary
Wireless Structural Control (WSC) systems are a representative class of cyber-physical sys-
tems that have the promise to protect our civil infrastructure in the event of earthquake and
other natural disasters. To develop WSC systems it is critical to capture both the cyber
aspects (wireless communication and control) and the physical aspects (structural dynamics)
through realistic and holistic simulations. We have developed the Wireless Cyber-Physical
Simulator (WCPS) that integrates a high-fidelity wireless simulator (TOSSIM) and a stan-
dard control system simulator (Simulink). With WCPS, we performed two case studies on
structural control systems. Each case study combines a realistic structural model and wire-
less simulations driven by traces collected from real-world deployments. Our case studies
leads to three important insights. First, there exist complex tradeoffs among data syn-
chronization, sensing delay, and network reliability under realistic wireless structural control
settings. Second, a realistic, integrated wireless control simulator like WCPS is critical in
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exploring the design tradeoffs in wireless control design. Finally, a control-scheduling co-
design approach is effective in wireless control design. In both case studies the integration of
a contant-delay control design and a scheduling scheme achieving data synchronization lead
to substantial improvement in control performance when compared to a traditional con-
trol design. Our cyber-physical simulation methodology and scheduling-control co-design
approaches presented in this work not only represent a promising step toward smart civil
infrastructure, but also provide useful insights and tools that can be generalized to other
cyber-physical systems employing wireless control. The WCPS tool and the case studies
have been released as open source software at http://wcps.cse.wustl.edu.
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Chapter 4
Incorporating Emergency Alarms in
Wireless Process Control
4.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor-actuator network (WSAN) technology is gaining adoptions in process in-
dustries due to their advantage in lowering deployment effort in challenging environments.
Industrial standard organizations such as ISA, HART, WINA and ZigBee, have been ac-
tively pushing the application of wireless technologies in industrial automation [33]. While
early success of industrial WSANs focused on monitoring applications, there is significant
value in exploring WSANs for process control applications to take full advantage of wireless
technology in industrial plants.
A wireless process control system employs feedback control loops to control the dynamic
response of industrial processes through communications in a shared WSAN. Since commu-
nication delays and packet drops may lead to severe degradation of control or even instability
of the system, it is critical to support real-time and reliable communication.
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(a) Ideal Control (b) Wireless Control
Figure 4.1: Control State Trajectory of A Coupled Water Tank System: Ideal vs. Wireless
Fig. 4.1 shows system state trajectories of wireless control versus ideal control for a water
tank system. Here ideal control means the case where communications occur with no delay
and no loss. Fig. 4.1(a) shows the ideal control system goes back to the shaded feasible
region, reaches the set point and succeeds in control in a couple of rounds. In contrast,
wireless control in Fig. 4.1(b) clearly takes more rounds and eventually fails to stabilize the
system within the time limit, due to control packet drops and the communication delay.
Hence, wireless control faces many challenges due to link failures and time varying delays
(e.g., delay caused by retransmissions). In the face of emergencies, the control problem
become even harder.
This work systematically investigates how to incorporate emergency alarms in wireless con-
trol systems, a problem that is critical in many real-world process plants, but yet received
little attention in the literature. Simple controllers commonly used in industrial process
control applications, such as PID or ON /OFF , can sometimes produce undesired responses,
since they do not explicitly handle safety constraints. For this reason, it is also common to
add safety measures, usually in the form of digital binary signals, to handle special situations
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that lead to physical damage of the plant, or even danger to the human operators. These
signals take the form of tripwires around dangerous zones, emergency triggers for human
operators, or contact switches in water tanks, among many others. In a wireless control
scenario, as the one described in this chapter, these emergency signals must be transmitted
using the same infrastructure as the regular control signals.
Despite significant body of theoretical results on real-time communication protocols and
scheduling for WSANs, earlier research has largely focused on regular feedback control
loops that employ communications in a periodic or event-driven fashion. Emergency alarms
presents a challenging communication and control design problem. While emergencies occur
sporadically, it is critical to communicate and handle emergency alarms in a timely fashion
when they happen. Moreover, the lack of realistic simulation tools in compliant with state-
of-art WSAN standards (e.g., WirelessHART [3]) has largely prevented in-depth wireless
process control research. In this chapter we present the following contributions to address
these challenges:
• We implement an WirelessHART protocol stack in the TOSSIM wireless simulator, on
top of its realistic link model for IEEE 802.15.4 radios.
• We build the Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator 2.0 that integrates Simulink and
TOSSIM for holistic wireless control study while supporting both periodic and event-
based simulations.
• We propose periodic and event-based real-time emergency communication protocols
for WSAN.
• We construct a systematic case study on a coupled water tank system controlled over
a 6-hop WSAN.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related works. Section 4.3
presents the system model of a wireless control system. Section 4.4 introduces the wireless
design. Section 4.5 details the control design. Section 4.6 presents systematic evaluation
results and Seciton 4.7 summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Related Work
Promising results have been reported in the wireless control literature. Case studies on
wireless structural monitoring and control systems were reported in [50,53,72,73]. Real-time
transmission scheduling and co-designs for WSANs has been investigated in [24,63,65,66,81].
Reliable routing algorithms for WSANs have been presented [33]. Unfortunately none of
these works considered emergency alarms.
Networked control systems have received tremendous attentions [16]. Discrete-time Kalman
filters have been proposed for state estimation based on intermittent observation [68]. Co-
design of transmission scheduling and controllers was explored in [27]. Passivity-based control
architecture was proposed for cyber-physical systems [41]. Fault-tolerant control under
uncertainties and time delays was studied in [25]. These work did not consider emergency
alarms either.
Progress on WSAN protocols have been reported. Self-triggered control approaches have
been developed for wireless networks [13, 75]. A distributed control approach has been
proposed for WSANs [58]. These works however focused only on regular feedback control
loops. Our work complements them by investigating emergency alarms alongside regular
feedback loops.
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Because large-scale real-world wireless control systems are not always available, a number
of simulation tools have been developed. Truetime [20] is a well established control system
simulator that enables holistic studies of CPU scheduling, communication and control al-
gorithms. NCSWT [29] is a useful simulator for wireless cyber-physical systems. None of
these simulators implemented WirelessHART, which is widely used in the industry. Gisoo
in [12] is a recent simulator for wireless control systems based on Cooja, but the wireless
link model in Cooja simulation remains to be improved. WCPS [47] connects Simulink and
TOSSIM. WCPS 2.0 as a further development in this chapter has incorporated substantial
changes including a new WirelessHART protocol stack. Finally, WCPS 2.0 can effectively
simulate aperiodic emergency events.
Despite the fact that fault detections have been heavily studied in wireless sensor network [22,
82] and process control [10,78], efforts in this study are orthogonal to existing fault tolerant
literatures because those efforts mostly detect and isolate faults caused by sensor or controller
failures rather than wireless link failures. Challenges arising from wireless link failures remain
a problem even after detection and isolation of sensor or control failures. As such, reliable
network protocols in this study is a natural complement for existing fault tolerant literature.
4.3 System Model
We consider a wireless control system consisting of a physical plant, a centralized controller
and a WSAN. Sensors and actuators communicate through a multi-hop WSAN forming a
multi-hop wireless mesh network. In the sensing phase, sensors send their measurements
to the controller. Control commands issued by the controller will be sent to actuators in
the actuation phase through the same WSAN.
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There are two types of flows in our system: periodic regular flows and aperiodic emergency
alarms. A regular flow generates packet periodically in both sensing phase and actuation
phase. Emergency alarms are triggered sporadically. Packets of a regular flow or an emer-
gency alarm must be delivered within its deadline. An emergency alarm is more critical than
a regular flow.
Based on the state-of-art WirelessHART standard [3], the WSAN adopts a centralized ar-
chitecture in our design. The Network Manager and Access Points are usually connected
by reliable wired links while the rest of the WSAN communicate using the wireless mesh
network. The transmission schedule is organized in terms of time slots (10 ms per slot). The
network protocol stack comprises (1) a routing layer that supports both source routing and
reliable graph routing. (2) a MAC layer running a multi-channel Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) protocol and (3) the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer for low-power radios.
4.4 Wireless Design
In this section, we firstly introduce our Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator [1] [47]; we then
describe our WirelessHART stack implementation; we finally we present our real-time emer-
gency communication protocols, and other major changes in WCPS 2.0.
Given a WirelessHART network, we consider the real-time communication problem of k + l
flows F = {E1, .., Ek, R1, ..., Rl}. Each regular flow Ri ∈ R is periodically generated with a
period Pi and a deadline Di, where Di ≤ Pi. As specified in Graph Routing [33], from the
source to the destination, there exists at least two outgoing links(one primary, one backup)
for every non-destination node. An emergency flow Ej ∈ E is triggered aperiodically with a
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Figure 4.2: Wireless Communication Protocols
deadline Dj. The communication latency Ln of a packet for a flow generated at slot n and
delivered at slot m is defined as m− n+ 1.
We observe the real-time communication problem for wireless control involve mixed critical-
ities, where the emergency flows have higher criticality than regular flows. The objectives
of real-time communication are two fold: (1) In the regular mode, i.e., when there is no
emergency, all regular flows should meet their deadlines; (2) In the emergency mode when
emergency occurs, emergency flows should meet their deadlines, while no guarantee is pro-
vided to regular flows.
The challenge in supporting emergency communication lies in the fact that emergencies occur
only occasionally and the system operates in the regular mode most of the time. However,
when emergency does occur, it is critical to meet the deadlines of emergency flows.
A simple approach to schedule an emergency flow is to reserve time slots for a virtual periodic
flow (also called a periodic server) that is scheduled alongside the regular flows. Emergency
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alarms are transmitted within the time slots designated to the periodic server. A drawback
of this periodic scheduling (PS) approach is that it wastes network bandwidth when there is
no emergency.
To avoid wasting resources during the regular mode, we introduce a slot stealing (SS) mech-
anism that allows regular flows to steal slots from emergency schedule when emergency does
not exist, and thus would enhance slot utilization during regular operations. Furthermore, we
propose event-based emergency communication to further improve network efficiency during
the emergency mode.
4.4.1 Periodic Scheduling (PS)
PS creates a virtual periodic flow for each emergency alarm and schedule them alongside the
regular flows. Emergency alarms are transmitted in the slots allocated for the corresponding
virtual periodic flow.
We adopt a fixed priority scheduling policy and a two-level priority assignment approach.
Virtual periodic flows always have higher priorities than regular flows. Among the virtual
periodic flows, we assign their priorities based on the rate monotonic policy. Similarly,
regular flows are also prioritized based on the rate monotonic policy.
For example, Fig. 4.2(a) illustrates a transmission schedule of PS. For simplicity purposes,
this example uses a single channel, but we consider multi-channel communication in our case
studies. Links in Fig. 4.2(a) are categorized as primary paths (solid lines) and backup paths
(dashed lines). Communication on primary paths happens in dedicated time slots while
communication on backup paths are scheduled in shared time slots, when different senders
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may contend for transmission opportunities. Emergency sensor E is scheduled to transmit to
Relay 1 in Slot 1 and Slot 2 . If either of the transmissions in Slot 1 or 2 succeeds, following
transmissions from Relay 1 to A1 will be scheduled in Slot 3 and Slot 4. However, if both
transmissions in Slot 1 and Slot 2 fail, a backup link will be used by E to transmit to Relay
2 and then from Relay 2 to A1, in shared Slot 3 and Slot 4, respectively. Data from the
regular sensor R will take similar scheduling and routing strategy. PS takes 9 slots in total
to schedule both flows. Algorithm 1 shows a detailed algorithm of PS.
Algorithm 1: Periodic Scheduling(PS)
input : E,R, routes, connectivity
output: S[1 · · ·T ][0 · · ·m− 1]
1 F ← {E,R}; ch← 0; m← total channel; T ←hyper period;
2 while (F 6= ∅) do
3 flo← Highest priority flow in F ; rout← {route of flo} ⊂ routes;
4 while (rout 6= ∅) do
5 send← first transmission on rout.
6 if (s ≤ T ) then
7 if ({conflicts in connectivity}= ∅) then S[s][ch]← send; ch← ch+ 1;
8 else
9 return unschedulable.
10 rout← rout− {send}; s← s+ 1;
11 F ← F − {flo};
12 return S[1 · · ·T ][0 · · ·m− 1];
4.4.2 Periodic Scheduling with Slot Stealing (SS)
In PS, time slots allocated to emergency flows are left unused when there is no emergency,
which is a waste of precious network resource. To overcome this limit, SS allows emergency
alarms and regular flows to be scheduled in the same dedicated slots. When emergency does
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not exist, emergency slots will be used(stealed) by regular flows instead. Whenever an emer-
gency exists, the emergency transmission would take the slot while the regular transmission
would back off.
Slot Stealing is technically inspired by hybrid MAC protocols such as Z-MAC [62]. An emer-
gency packet is transmitted immediately at the beginning of a slot shared with the regular
packet. In contrast, a regular packet first performs a Clear Channel Assessment(CCA) after
waiting for a constant backoff time. If there is any other transmission going on(likely from
an emergency sender), the regular sender would cease its transmission. Otherwise, it goes
ahead and transmit the packet.
Fig. 4.2(b) shows an example of SS. Following the same retransmission and Graph routes as
PS, we see SS takes 5 time slots (4 slots fewer) to accommodate both flows. Algorithm 2
depicts the detailed algorithm of SS.
4.4.3 Event-based Slot Stealing (SS-Event)
There are two alternative approaches to send emergency alarms during an emergency. For
systems that need to periodically monitor and control the emergency state, an emergency
control flow is activated whenever emergencies exist. The emergency flow then periodically
generates sensor data and control command until the emergency is over.
For systems that do not need to periodically monitor and control the emergency state, the
system can adopt an event-based approach to communicate the emergency alarms, i.e., an
emergency sensor only sends an alarm-start and an alarm-end packets in the beginning and
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Algorithm 2: Scheduling with Slot Stealing
input : E,R, routes, connectivity
output: S[1 · · ·T ][0 · · ·m− 1]
1 ch← 0; m← total channel; T ←hyper period;
2 Schedule E with the PS algorithm.
3 while (R 6= ∅) do
4 flo← Highest priority flow in R; rout← {route of flo} ⊂ routes;
5 while (route 6= ∅) do
6 send← first transmission on rout.
7 if (s ≤ T ) then
8 if ({conflicts in connectivity}= ∅) then
9 if ({free channel} 6= ∅) then S[s][ch]← send; ch← ch+ 1;
10 else ch← sharable ch of emergencies; S[s][ch]← send;// Steal
11 else
12 if ({shareable channel} 6= ∅) then ch← sharable ch of emergencies;
S[s][ch]← send;// Steal
13 else return unschedulable;
14 else
15 return unschedulable.
16 rout← rout− {send}; s← s+ 1;
17 R← R−{flo};
18 return S[1 · · ·T ][0 · · ·m− 1];
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end of the emergency. While this event-based communication results in the same trans-
mission schedule as in Algorithm 2, event-based SS communication can significantly reduce
the number of regular transmissions that are affected by emergency transmissions, poten-
tially leading to better control performance. Hence forth, we denote the combination of
event-based communication and SS as SS-Event.
We note SS and SS-Event have clear tradeoffs between data loads and communication relia-
bility. Periodic flows in SS on one hand would reduce chances of missing emergency alarms
while on the other it would override regular flows with excessive periodic traffics(in stealed
slot). In contrast, SS-Event has less impact on regular flows but runs at the danger of
completely missing critical alarm packets.
4.5 Control Design
We apply our emergency handling protocol in a coupled water tank system as a case study.
In this section we describe the dynamical model of the water tank system and our controller
design.
4.5.1 Coupled Water Tank
A diagram of the coupled water tank is shown in Figure 4.3. This system shares similar
dynamics with many other process control systems, e.g., irrigation networks [13]. Our choice
to use this system as a case study is based on its simple yet representative dynamics, its
hybrid dynamical nature (as the evolution of the system changes when the water tanks are
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Figure 4.3: Diagram of the coupled water tank system. The water levels of Tank 1, Tank 2,
and Basin are denoted L1, L2, and Lb, respectively. The emergency water levels are denoted
LH1 , L
H
2 , L
L
b , and L
H
b . The natural pipe flows are denoted u, v12, v1b, v2b. The state of the
valve is denoted d ∈ {0, 1}, where d = 1 if the valve is ON .
either full or empty), and more importantly, its similarity to systems commonly used in
industrial applications.
The coupled water tank system is comprised of one pump, one ON /OFF valve, two water
tanks, and one basin. The pump is responsible for pushing water from the basin to Tank 1.
The flow through the pump is a controlled variable, denoted u. Tank 1 is placed higher than
Tank 2, and water flows due to gravity via a pipe at the bottom of Tank 1 placed above
Tank 2.
The flow through this pipe is denoted v12, and satisfies the following equation:
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Figure 4.4: Diagram of the state space of the coupled water tank system. The gray plane
corresponds to the feasible states since no water enters or exits the system. The dark region
of the plane corresponds to the region where no emergencies occur. The dotted lines show
emergency limits, and the solid lines show the physical limits of the tanks.
v12 =
1
ρR12
√
ρ g L1, (4.1)
where ρ is the density of water, g is the gravity constant, R12 is the resistance parameter of
the pipe, and L1 is the level in Tank 1.
Similarly, Tank 2 is placed higher than the basin, and water flows via a pipe at the bottom
of Tank 2 placed above the basin. The flow through this pipe is denoted v2b, and satisfies
the following equation:
v2b =
1
ρR2b
√
ρ g L2, (4.2)
where, besides the parameters defined in Equation (4.1), R2b is the resistance parameter of
the pipe, and L2 is the level in Tank 2.
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A pipe at the bottom of Tank 1, above the basin, is interrupted by the ON /OFF valve,
hence water flows only when the valve is ON . The flow through this pipe, denoted v1b is zero
when the valve is OFF , and satisfies the following equation when the valve is ON :
v1b =
1
ρR1b
√
ρ g L1, (4.3)
where R1b is the resistance parameter of the pipe.
Using conservation of mass and equations (4.1) to (4.3) we get the following dynamic equa-
tions for the coupled water tank system:
dL1
dt
=

1
ρA1
(−v12 − v1b d+ u) if L1 ∈ [0, Lmax1 ],
0 otherwise,
(4.4)
dL2
dt
=

1
ρA2
(
v12 − v2b
)
if L2 ∈ [0, Lmax2 ],
0 otherwise,
(4.5)
dLb
dt
=

1
ρAb
(
v1b d+ v2b − u
)
if Lb ∈ [0, Lmaxb ],
0 otherwise,
(4.6)
where Lmax1 , L
max
2 , and L
max
b are the physical heights of the tanks, A1, A2, and Ab are the
areas of the tanks, and d ∈ {0, 1} is a controlled variable such that d = 1 when the valve is
ON , and d = 0 when the valve is OFF .
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4.5.2 System Emergencies
In our case study, the objective is to achieve set-point tracking of the water level in the Tank
2 by adjusting the flow u. We assume that Tank 2 has a level sensor (measuring L2), and
that the pump allows us to fully control the flow u ∈ [0, uM ].
We also define four emergency situations, three of them corresponding to each water tank
having too much water, which may produce spillage, and one corresponding to the basin
having too little water, which may lead to the pump sucking air instead of water. Using the
notation in Figure 4.3, the emergencies occur in the following situations: L1 > L
H
1 , L2 > L
H
2 ,
Lb > L
H
b , and Lb < L
L
b .
Note that the coupled water tank system is closed, i.e., it only recirculates water, and no
water enter or leaves the system. This condition can be observed from equations (4.4)
to (4.6), since A1
dL1
dt
+ A2
dL2
dt
+ Ab
dLb
dt
= 0 (when the water levels are within the normal
limits). In other words, A1 L1(t) + A2 L2(t) + Ab Lb(t) = A1 L1(0) + A2 L2(0) + Ab Lb(0) for
each t ≥ 0. Using this extra constraint, even though the system has three states, we can
plot its trajectories in a two-dimensional plane, as shown in Figure 4.4. The dark region
in that figure corresponds to the subset of the two-dimensional plane where no emergencies
occur. The rest of the two-dimensional plane corresponds to the state space where at least
one emergency is active. The two-dimensional plane is bounded by the physical constraints
of the system, i.e., the fact that all levels must remain above zero and below the maximum
height.
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4.5.3 Actuator and Controller Design
For water level control in Tank 2 we use a PID controller sensing L2 and acting on u. Also,
to efficiently correct emergencies, the valve, which is normally OFF , is sometimes switched
to ON . Thus, the control strategy for this system is hybrid, since whenever an emergency
is activated the controller behavior is changed. PID parameters are decided empirically in
this study, we refer interested users to our code for more design details.
The PID controller, used when no emergencies are active, follows the following equations:
u(t) = K
(
e(t) +
1
Ti
∫ t
0
e(s) ds+ Td
de
dt
(t)
)
, (4.7)
where e(t) = Lsp2 − L2(t), Lsp2 is the desired set-point, and K, Ti, and Td are the controller
parameters. Also, whenever the right-hand side of equation (4.7) is above uM then we set
u(t) = uM , and when it is below zero then we set u(t) = 0. The interested readers can go
to [14] for more details regarding PID controllers.
We apply the following rules when emergencies are activated, in priority order:
1. If L1 > L
H
1 , L2 > L
H
2 , or Lb < L
L
b , we set u = 0 and d = 1 (i.e., shut off the pump and
open the valve).
2. If Lb > L
H
b , and either L1 > L
H
1 or L2 > L
H
2 , then we set u = 0 and d = 1.
3. If Lb > L
H
b , we set u = u
M and d = 0 (i.e., pump as much water as possible from the
basin and close the valve).
The rules above are heuristics designed under the assumption that maintaining the level in
Tanks 1 and 2 is more important than maintaining the level in the basin. Hence, if either
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Tank 1 or Tank 2 have too much water, or if the basin has too little water, we transport
water from the Tanks to the basin as quickly as possible (Rule 1). Since removing water from
either of the Tanks conflicts with removing water from the basin, the Tanks take precedence
(Rule 2). Finally, if the water level in the basin is too high then we pump water from the
basin as quickly as possible (Rule 3).
To avoid high frequency switching between different emergency modes (or even Zeno execu-
tions [37]), the controller is forced to stay at least κ > 0 seconds in each mode after it is
activated.
4.6 Case Study
This section presents performance evaluations with a case study. The objective here is not
simply to compare networking protocols. Rather, we would like to systematically evaluate
our holistic framework, including the WCPS 2.0 simulator, the WirelessHART stack, as well
as the real-time communication protocols.
To stress the WSAN, we have implemented two sets of Coupled Water Tank systems sharing
the same WSAN. Each coupled water tank set is comprised of two water tanks and one basin.
In total we have 4 tanks and 2 basins in the plant. We have attached 8 emergencies sensors
and 2 regular sensors for monitoring purposes. In our system, plant data is first generated by
water tanks and then fed into the WSAN in TOSSIM. Having been transmitted through the
WSAN, sensor data with delay and loss information will be updated to the controller. Control
commands from the controller would later be transmitted through the downlink WSAN and
eventually applied for closed-loop control. We note since WirelessHART adopts deterministic
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Figure 4.5: Link Failure Ratio
TDMA schedules, in this evaluation we focus more on impact of network reliabilities instead
of network delays; for sensor data that have not arrived before the deadline (e.g., dropped
or missed the deadline), control decisions are made upon most recent available packet from
the same sensor.
4.6.1 Network Performance
In our study, wireless traces from a 21-node subset of the Wustl Testbed [4] have been used
to form a WSAN in TOSSIM, with a maximum path length of 6 hops . We directly use
the connectivity and the multi-channel wireless noises from the Wustl Testbed; on the other
hand, we use controlled Received Signal Strength with uniform gaps to simulate various
wireless signal strength. Fig. 4.5 shows link quality statistics (3000 packets), where -74 dBm
58
80
85
90
95
100
Signal Strength and Corresponding Link Failure Ratio
En
d−
to
−e
nd
 D
el
ive
ry
 R
at
io
 o
f E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Fl
ow
s(%
)
 
 
−78dBm
34.5%
−74dBm
20%
−70dBm
14.7%
−66dBm
8.5%
−62dBm
5.8%
SS−Event
SS
PS
(a) Delivery Ratio for Emergencies
80
85
90
95
100
Signal Strength and Corresponding Link Failure Ratio
En
d−
to
−e
nd
 D
el
ive
ry
 R
at
io
 o
f R
eg
ul
ar
 F
lo
ws
(%
)
 
 
−78dBm
34.5%
−74dBm
20%
−70dBm
14.7%
−66dBm
8.5%
−62dBm
5.8%
SS−Event
SS
PS
(b) Delivery Ratio for Regular Flows
Figure 4.6: Average End-to-end Delivery Ratio
and -62 dBm features 20% and 5.8% averaged link failure under the Wustl Testbed noise,
respectively.
Fig. 4.6 shows end-to-end delivery ratios of the three communication protocols implemented
in WCPS 2.0. Since all experiments are done with the Wustl Testbed noise, we show both
Received Signal Strength and corresponding Link Failure Ratio on the x-axis. In other
words, multi-hop end-to-end delivery ratios in Fig. 4.6 can be reproduced in WCPS 2.0 as
long as Link Failure Ratio is the same, whereas signal strength and noise traces needn’t. As
in Fig. 4.6(a) and Fig. 4.6(b), both types of flows have better end-to-end delivery ratios as
link failures improve(Received Signal Strength increases).
It is interesting to see PS, SS and SS-Event all achieve over 95% emergency delivery and
90% regular flow delivery ratios at 20% link failure ratio (-74dBm), implying that Graph
Routing is working properly. Note for all 3 protocols, emergencies in Fig. 4.6(a) outperforms
regular flows in Fig. 4.6(b), which is because emergency flows always have higher transmission
priorities over regular ones. If we compare SS against SS-Event in Fig. 4.6(a) and Fig. 4.6(b),
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Figure 4.7: Number of Transmissions under Various Wireless Conditions
respectively, we can see SS has better emergency alarm delivery ratios (because of redundant
periodic flows) and worse regular flow deliveries (because of conflicts from emergencies).
Fig. 4.7 further shows number of transmissions (50 second simulation) under various wireless
conditions. Dark part of a bar means transmission counts for emergencies while light parts
represent traffics for regular flows. As expected, PS and SS have more emergency transmis-
sions due to the periodic nature. For regular traffics, it is interesting to see that SS has more
regular traffics than the other two, which is because of retransmissions caused by backoffs
during Slot Stealing. This also validates correctness of our WirelessHART stack and the Slot
Stealing mechanism.
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4.6.2 Control Performance
In our control evaluations, we choose to study cases with challenging initial conditions(e.g.,
small trapezoid area in Fig. 4.4). System failure is defined in twofold: first, the system can
not stabilize inside feasible region given a time bound, e.g., 100 seconds; second, the system
violates physical constraints, e.g., water spilling.
We further adopt three general evaluation metrics: system failure ratio, time percentage
outside the feasible region, and maximum distance to the feasible region. Time percentage
outside the feasible region is defined as the time percentage when the system state is out
of the feasible region but within the control time limit. Maximum distance to the feasible
region is defined as the maximum distance of system state to the feasible region(see Fig. 4.4).
Simulations were executed under the following conditions:
• No emergency exists at the beginning;
• Total amount of water (i.e. A1 L1(0) +A2 L2(0) +Ab Lb(0)) is equivalent to maximum
allowed capacity of Tank 2 and Basin (A2 L
H
2 + Ab L
H
b );
• Emergency control runs at maximally supported frequency by the WSAN.
• Each simulation lasts 200 seconds, decided by the system time constant.
In our case study, we set control period consistently as 1Hz for regular loops while setting
emergency control on the maximally supported frequency, bounded by the operation period
of the WSAN. For example, TDMA superframe for SS-Event has 48 time slots and hence the
maximally supported operation frequency for SS-Event is 2Hz(i.e., 500ms period). Similarly,
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Figure 4.10: Emergency Time Percentage under 20% Link Failures (-74dBm Wireless Signal
Strength)
PS who has a longer superframe can only operate at a slower control frequency, i.e., 1Hz in
our case study.
All statistics in Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.10 are done under 20% link failures (-74dBm wireless
signal strength), with results averaged from 15 simulations (3000 control steps). System
failure ratios in Fig. 4.8 shows SS-Event has achieved the closest performance compared
to Ideal(Wired) Control, which is because SS-Event has higher emergency control frequency
and hence shorter delays. A close look shows that SS is less successful than SS-Event is
because SS has consistently dropped too many regular packets due to conflicts.
Maximum distance to the feasible region of Tank 2 in Fig. 4.9 and time percentage outside
the feasible region in Fig. 4.10 shows the same trend that SS-Event is the better than the
other two. Fig. 4.11 further depicts control performance of SS-Event under various wireless
conditions. For cases featuring 5.8% link failures, SS-Event have 0% system failure, i.e.,
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Figure 4.11: System Failure under Various Wireless Conditions
100% control success. This is indeed encouraging as it demonstrates even for a 6-hop lossy
wireless network, successful system control can still be achieved with careful wireless designs.
In sum, sitting on top of the state-of-art WirelessHART protocol stack in WCPS 2.0, we
for the first time have been able to do scalable case studies for wireless emergency handling,
and encouraging experiment results have been achieved. The periodic and event-based com-
munication framework can be easily tailored according to application needs or optimization
formulations, which is beyond the scope of this work and left for future studies.
4.7 Summary
Recent years have witnessed significant interests in adopting wireless sensor-actuator net-
works in process control. However, the problem of incorporating emergency alarms in wireless
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process control remains to be explored. This chapter presents the first systematic approach
to integrate emergency alarms into wireless process control systems. The challenge in emer-
gency communication lies in the fact that emergencies occur occasionally, but must be deliv-
ered within their deadlines when they occur. The contributions of this work are three-fold:
(1) we propose efficient real-time emergency communication protocols based on slot stealing
and event-based communication; (2) we build an open-source WirelessHART protocol stack
in the Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator (WCPS) for holistic simulations of wireless control
systems; (3) we conduct systematic studies on a coupled water tank system controlled over a
6-hop 21-node WSAN. Our results demonstrate our real-time emergency communication ap-
proach enables timely emergency handling, while allowing regular feedback control loops to
effectively share resources in WSANs during normal operations. Our work demonstrates the
feasibility and efficacy of incorporating emergency alarms into wireless process control sys-
tems. Moreover, WCPS 2.0 with the WirelessHART protocol stack and case studies provide
an enabling framework for exploring wireless process control design and hence represents a
promising step toward practical wireless process control systems.
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Chapter 5
Wireless Routing and Control: A
Cyber-Physical Case Study
5.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor-actuator network (WSAN) technology is gaining rapid adoption in process
industries to lower deployment and maintenance costs in challenging industrial environ-
ments [54]. Industrial standard organizations such as ISA [5], HART [9], WINA [6] and
ZigBee [8] have been actively pushing WSAN for industrial automation [64]. While early
success of industrial WSANs primarily focused on monitoring applications, it remains chal-
lenging to support actuation applications over WSANs due to their vulnerability to packet
loss. To realize the full potential of WSANs for both sensing and actuation, wireless con-
trol has received considerable attention in recent research on control theory. For example,
state observers have been employed to compensate for packet loss from sensors [69], while
previous control inputs can be buffered at actuators for use in case of packet loss from the
controller [38]. Despite considerable success in theoretical advancements in wireless control
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design, however, there has been limited empirical studies on wireless control systems com-
bining state-of-the-art control design and standard-based industrial WSANs under realistic
wireless conditions.
This chapter presents a cyber-physical study on a wireless process control system to sys-
tematically explore the interactions between wireless routing and control design, a problem
that has received little attention in the literature. On the network side, the WirelessHART
standard supports two alternative routing strategies including single-path source routing and
multi-path graph routing, where graph routing reduces packet loss through path diversity
at the cost of additional overhead and energy consumption. On the control side the system
integrates an observer based on an Extended Kalman Filter, a model predictive controller
and an actuator with a buffer for recent control inputs. The case study is implemented
in the Wireless Cyber-Physical Simulator (WCPS) [46, 47] that integrates Simulink and a
WirelessHART protocol stack based on a realistic wireless model and traces collected from
a real-world wireless testbed. Our experiments demonstrate a wireless control system can
have different levels of resilience to packet loss for sensing and actuation. Specifically in our
case study, while the state observer is highly effective in mitigating the effects of packet loss
from the sensors to the controller, the control performance is more sensitive to packet loss
from the controller to the actuators despite the buffered control inputs.
Motivated by this observation, we propose an asymmetric routing approach for WSANs [45].
In contrast to traditional WSANs that employ a uniform routing strategy in the entire net-
work, asymmetric routing can employ different routing strategies for sensing and actuation.
This flexible routing approach enables a cyber-physical co-design approach to wireless con-
trol design where routing strategies can be tailored for the characteristics of control design.
For example, in our case study an asymmetric routing configuration (source routing for
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sensing and graph routing for actuation) effectively improve performance under significant
packet loss. Our results highlight the importance of co-joining the design of wireless network
protocols and control in wireless control systems.
The contributions of this work are three-fold.
1. A cyber-physical framework that integrates state-of-art control techniques such as
observers, MPC, buffered actuation, all connected through a standard-based Wire-
lessHART network;
2. An asymmetric WSAN routing approach that enables differentiated redundancies of
sensing and actuation under the proposed control framework;
3. A systematic case study that presents in-depth interaction of wireless routing and
control in a holistic fashion.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses related works. Section 5.3
introduces the wireless control design. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 present the design and results of
the case study. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Related Work
There have been extensive studies on WSAN routing. A thorough review on routing schemes
in wireless sensor networks was presented in [11]. Detailed routing requirements in low-power
and lossy networks for industrial applications were introduced in [60]. A graph routing algo-
rithm for WirelessHART was presented in [33]. A conflict-ware real-time routing algorithm
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Figure 5.1: System Architecture: Sensor measurements from sensors are transmitted wire-
lessly to the observer, which generates estimated system states. The controller takes esti-
mated system states and computes actuation commands, which again are transmitted to
actuators wirelessly. We introduce a buffer for actuators such that we can reuse previously
buffered actuation inputs when packet drops happen.
for industrial WSAN was presented in [80]. An energy-efficient routing approach was in-
troduced in [79]. Energy-aware routing for real-time and reliable wireless industrial sensor
networks was introduced in [34]. These works focus solely on the network without considering
the control aspect of a wireless control system.
Networked control has received considerable attentions. Passivity-based control architec-
ture was proposed for cyber-physical systems in [41]. Self-triggered control has been devel-
oped for wireless networks [13, 75]. A distributed control approach has been proposed for
WSANs [58]. State observers such as Kalman filters have been proven to be resilient against
uncertainties [52, 67]. An effective Kalman filter was introduced based on intermittent ob-
servations [68]. While the results are encouraging, these works do not consider the routing
of a wireless mesh network based on industrial standards.
Cyber-physical co-design has emerged as an effective approach for wireless control system
design. A co-design of transmission scheduling and control was explored in [27]. Sampling
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rate selection for wireless control systems is studied in [65]. Etherware in [16,38] introduced a
middleware architecture for wireless control comprised of state observers, MPC and actuation
buffers. Etherware was designed based on a WiFi network and did not investigate the issue of
routing in industrial wireless mesh networks. To our best knowledge, none of aforementioned
works addressed the interaction between routing and control, which is the focus of our work.
5.3 Wireless Control Design
In this section, we first give an overview of our system architecture. We then introduce the
control design. The wireless network design is introduced finally.
5.3.1 System Overview
We consider a wireless control system consisting of a physical plant, a centralized controller
and a shared WSAN. Sensors and actuators communicate through a multi-hop wireless mesh
network. In sensing, sensors send their measurements to the controller. Actuation commands
computed by the controller are sent to actuators during actuation through the same WSAN.
The system architecture is shown in Fig. 5.1.
On the control side, we use state-of-art control schemes. We first introduce an observer in
sensing to mitigate uncertainties caused by the wireless network. We next adopt an Model
Predictive Control (MPC) as the controller. On actuators, we introduce a buffer which stores
a sequence of control commands computed by the MPC.
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5.3.2 Control Design
Sensing with Extended Kalman Filter
State observers such as Kalman filters have been shown to be resilient against uncertain-
ties [52, 67, 68]. We have implemented an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) as part of our
cyber physical case study to robustly estimate the state of the physical plant under packet
loss in the wireless network.
An EKF is in practice a recursive algorithm with two main steps: prediction and update.
In simple terms, the prediction step estimates the states of the system associated to the
previous step. Then, the update step compares the current outputs estimation with newly
arrived sensing data yk, and improves the estimation of the current state variables. Yet,
when packets are dropped by the wireless network, the update step needs to be modified,
as described by Sinopoli et al. in [68]. In their chapter, they propose a modified update
step which disregards the sensing data when a packet is dropped. For this reason we use a
modified EKF with their idea in our WSAN closed-loop system.
Model Predictive Control with Buffers
As a controller for our closed-loop WSAN system, we have adopted a Model Predictive Con-
trol scheme (MPC, also referred to as Receding Horizon Control) [30]. MPC is implemented
by solving a finite-horizon optimal control problem, with horizon T > 0, every ∆ seconds,
where usually ∆ is the sampling rate of a discrete-time and ∆  T . An ideal MPC has
a horizon T as large as possible, to approximate infinite-horizon optimal control, and ∆ as
small as possible, to observe the state often and therefore react to changes fast. In real-world
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applications, however, as T increases, so does the computation cost, which in turn forces us
to choose a smaller T or a larger ∆.
Although a sequence of control commands are computed by the MPC, corresponding to the
whole time horizon of length T , only the first sample is commonly used for actuation while
the rest are discarded. To improve the resilience, instead of transmitting the first sample, we
transmit a certain sequence of values in the prediction horizon, which is received by a buffer
next to the actuator, and feeds the actuator with one control input per time sample. If the
wireless network does not drop packets then the buffer is completely replaced every time
sample with a new sequence of control inputs. But if the wireless network drops a packet,
then the buffer simply applies the next available control input, which was received in the
last packet that arrived successfully. We refer to this approach as a buffered control, which
even though it is not a new term [17,18], to our knowledge this is the first chapter studying
it in conjunction with a wireless mesh network based on the WirelessHART standard. In
particular, we present what to our knowledge the first systematic study of the interaction
between wireless routing protocols and control.
In Fig. 5.1, the state observer takes measurements y(k) from the plant to produce estimated
system states xˆ(k); a MPC takes these estimates xˆ(k), compares against the reference signal
and generate a sequence of predicted control commands
[
u(k), u(k + 1), . . . , u(k + w)
]
with
a length of w, which we explain later with more details. The sequence is later stored in a
buffer on the actuator and u(k), the control command corresponding to the current time, is
applied to the actuator.
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5.3.3 Network Design
WirelessHART Architecture We adopt a WirelessHART [9] architecture for our WSAN
design. WirelessHART uses multiple channels defined in IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer spec-
ification, and adopts channel hopping for sake of channel diversity. Any excessively noisy
channel will be blacklisted by the centralized network manager.
A WirelessHART network is a multi-hop mesh network consisting of a number of field de-
vices connected to a gateway through access points. The network is managed by a central-
ized network manager. The network manager collects topology information from the field
devices, computes routes and the transmission schedules, and disseminates the routing in-
formation and schedules among field devices. Transmissions are scheduled based on Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) comprised of 10ms time slots. For transmissions between
sender/receiver pairs, a time slot can either be dedicated or shared. In a dedicated slot, only
one sender is allowed to transmit. In a shared slot, more than one senders compete for one
transmission opportunity.
Routing Strategies WirelessHART supports two alternative routing strategies: graph rout-
ing and source routing. Source routing provides a single route for each data flow, whereas graph
routing firstly allocates a primary path from the source to the destination and further adds
backup path from each intermediate node to the destination. In source routing, only one
sender/receiver pair will be considered for the first transmission and one more retransmission.
In graph routing, the network manager allocates a dedicated slot for the first transmission,
followed by a retransmission slot between the same sender/receiver pair; finally, the network
manager allocates a second retransmission in a shared slot for the same sender but a different
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receiver on the routing graph. In other words, graph routing supports up to 3 transmis-
sion attempts for a single packet, which as we show later significantly improves end-to-end
delivery ratios.
Despite differentiated redundancies offered by graph and source routing, there are more
tradeoffs between the two in terms of costs. For example, more retransmissions in graph
routing potentially will cause higher energy costs. Further, in a control system driven by
a TDMA network, a design employing graph routing will need more time slots, and thus a
longer network period, which in turn results in lower control frequency. Source routing on
the other hand features less energy consumption, faster network period, but worse network
reliabilities. We show results with more details in Section 5.5.
Asymmetric Routing Traditional WSAN networks such as WirelessHART employs a uni-
form routing strategy across an entire network. That is, if the operator chooses graph routing,
a graph routing protocol will be used for all flows in the network. However, we observe that
the control system has different levels of resiliency to packet loss for sensing and actuation.
For example, in our specific case study, the state observer is highly effective in mitigating the
effects of packet loss from sensors to the controller. In comparison, the system performance
is more vulnerable to packet loss from the controller to actuators despite the help of the
actuation buffers.
Motivated by this key observation, we propose a novel asymmetric routing approach tailored
for wireless control. Under asymmetric routing, the sensing and actuation routes can be
configured independently from each other, so that different routing strategies may be used
for sensing and actuation. For example, as the control system is less vulnerable to packet
loss for sensing than that for actuation, we choose to employ source routing for sensing and
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graph routing for actuation. Note the flexibility of asymmetric routing enables a cyber-
physical co-design approach by tailoring the routing strategies based on the characteristics
of the control systems. As a result, the network can use graph routing to provide reliable
communication to the part of the control system that is more vulnerable to packet loss,
while employing source routing to the more resilient part of the control system to conserve
network resources and energy, thereby combining the benefits of graph routing and source
routing. As demonstrated in our case study (see Section 5.5), asymmetric routing clearly
outperforms traditional designs with uniform routing.
While the asymmetric routing approach can be based on any source and graph routing
algorithms, our current implementation extends the energy-efficient source routing and graph
routing algorithms presented in [79]. Those original algorithms were designed to improve the
network lifetime of a WirelessHART network, e.g., the operation time till the first field device
runs out of its battery. As many WSANs operate on batteries in industrial environments,
network lifetime is an important concern for industrial WSANs. Due to the extra paths
and transmissions involved in graph routing, the graph routing algorithm results in shorter
network lifetime than the source routing algorithm. In [79] the source routing and graph
routing algorithms were designed as separate algorithms each of which is applied to the entire
network when used. We extend and combine those algorithms in an asymmetric routing
framework, where different routing strategies can be applied to sensing and actuation.
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5.4 Case Study Design
In this section, we first introduce an exothermic chemical reaction system as our control plant.
We then introduce detailed design of the Extended Kalman Filter and buffered actuation;
The WSAN implementation will be introduced in the end.
All the following design and case studies are performed in WCPS [47], an open-source sim-
ulator for holistic simulations of wireless control systems. WCPS supports co-simulation
of control systems implemented in Simulink and WSAN implemented in TOSSIM. WCPS
has previously been used for realistic case studies of wireless structural control systems [47],
wireless process control systems [46], and was recently used to build a benchmark problem
for wireless structural control released to the civil engineering community [73]
5.4.1 Physical Plant
A diagram of our dynamical system, consisting of the exothermic chemical reaction of two
fluids flowing between a collections of tanks, is shown in Figure 5.2. Although our dynamical
system only considers a few state variables, its dynamic overall behavior is similar to that
of many industrial process control systems, such as irrigation networks [13] or oil refiner-
ies [83]. Our choice of this plant is also motivated on its rich nature, since the system’s state
considers a mix of chemical, temperature, and fluid level variables, involving both fast and
slow dynamics.
The system is comprised of four tanks: Tank 1 is fed with chemical reagent a via a Reagent
Tank connected with a pump, and Tank 2 is fed with chemical reagent b in a similar fashion.
Tank 1 is placed higher than Tank 2, then the fluid in Tank 1 flows into Tank 2 due to the
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gravity. The liquid levels of Tank 1 and Tank 2 are denoted L1(t) and L2(t), respectively.
The temperature of the solution in Tank 2 is denoted T2(t). The concentrations of chemical
reagents a and b in Tank 2 are denoted by A(t) and B(t), respectively. There are two
actuator inputs in this system consisting of the pumps feeding Tanks 1 and 2, denoted u1(t)
and u2(t), respectively.
-2-101
Pump 1
Heater
1L
2L
Tank 1
Tank 2
Reagent Tank 2
2u
b
Reagent Tank 1
1u
a
Pump 2
Figure 5.2: Exothermic Chemical Reaction Plant
Table 5.1 shows the list of parameters modeling the dynamic behavior of our plant. To
simplify our notation we define:
g(L) = α arctan(β L). (5.1)
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which we use to approximate the pressure of a fluid in a Tank’s output pipe with fluid level
L.
The level of fluid in Tank 1 is modeled using the following differential equation:
A1 L˙1 = −k1 g(L1) + u1. (5.2)
Similarly, the level of fluid in in Tank 2 is modeled by:
A2 L˙2 = k1 g(L1)− k2 g(L2) + u2. (5.3)
The dynamical model for the temperature in Tank 2 is:
A2 L2 T˙2 = Hc
(
k1 t1 g(L1) − A2 T2 g(L2) + t2 u2
)
+ h2 L2 + Hr rc kr AB exp
(
− Ea
RT2
)
.
(5.4)
where an exothermic reaction, transforming reagents a and b into solution c, produces heat
following an exponential model. The rate at which both reagents change follows the following
model:
A˙
B˙
 = [a0 k1 g(L1)− k2Ag(L2)− k2B g(L2) + b0 u2] −
ra
rb
 kr AB exp(− Ea
RT2
)
.
(5.5)
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Figure 5.3: Open-loop Step Response
Fig. 5.3 shows the response of the plant when a step is applied in each input, u1 and u2,
at t = 1. We observe that the step response of the plant becomes stable at about t = 30.
Therefore, the time constant of the plant’s response to a step is roughly 4 seconds.
5.4.2 Observer and Controller Implementation
As explained above, we use an Extended Kalman Filter for intermittent observations, as
described in [68], as our observer, and a Model Predictive Control scheme with signal buffers
as our controller. Using the same notation as in Figure 5.1, the output of the system
is y(k) =
[
L2(k), T2(k)
]
which is sent to the EKF via the wireless network. It is worth
noting that the EKF also receives the input u(k) computed by the MPC scheme, as is
common with dynamical state observers which require the inputs and outputs of the plant
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Name Physical Meaning Value
L1, L2 fluid levels of Tanks 1 and 2 —, — m
T2 temperature in Tank 2 —
◦C
A, B concentrations of reagents a
and b in Tank 2
—, — mol/L
u1, u2 input flow rate of Pump 1
Pump 2
—, — L/s
Hr reaction energy generation rate — J/s
A1, A2 cross sectional areas of Tank 1
and Tank 2
2, 2 m2
k1, k2 flow rates of the pipes in Tank 1
and Tank 2
1, 1 L/s
√
m
t1, t2 temperatures of reagents a and
b
20, 20 ◦C
Hc heat generated per mol of reac-
tion
0.5 J ◦C/mol
h2 power of heater 40 J/s
a0, b0 concentrations of a, b in each
Reagent Tank
1, 1 mol/L
ra, rb, rc reaction rates of reagents a, b,
and c
1, 1, 1
Ea activation energy of chemical
reaction
1 J ◦C/mol
R molar gas constant 8.134 J/Kmol
α, β pipe flow model parameters 2, 0.5
kr reaction rate constant 0.2 mol/s
Table 5.1: Plant Parameters
to estimate its states. Yet, the input actually applied to the plant is uˆ(k), which is equal
to u(k) whenever the wireless network successfully delivers a packet, but it differs from u(k)
when the network fails to deliver the latest input update (in that case uˆ(k) equal the next
available packet in the buffer, as explained in Section 5.4.3). We added this simplification in
our closed-loop implementation because the buffer is located remotely from the EKF, hence
our state observer has no way of knowing (without delay) whether uˆ(k) equals u(k) or not.
Assuming that all actuation packets are successfully delivered is a reasonable compromise in
this situation.
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Figure 5.4: Buffered Actuation Mechanism
Our MPC scheme solves a discrete-time finite-horizon constrained Linear-Quadratic Regu-
lator (LQR) optimal control problem at each time step. Given u(k − 1), we linearize the
system around this control signal and use those matrices in our controller, satisfying safety
box constraints for states and inputs. An integrator was added to the controller model to
eliminate the steady-state bias in our regulation objective, hence the controller considers a
model with 7 states, the original 5 states of the plant plus 2 integrators (one for each input).
The prediction horizon was chosen as N = 21, yet due to constraints in the network packet
size we only transmit to the buffer 8 of the 21 input samples in each iteration. The result-
ing quadratic programming optimization problem was solved in Matlab/Simulink using the
solver quadprog.
5.4.3 Buffered Actuation
As mentioned above, we place a buffer on each actuator. The size of the buffer is primarily
decided by the capacity of an IEEE 802.15.4 packet, as we assume that actuation commands
are carried by one packet per control period. The packet size defined by IEEE 802.15.4 is
128 bytes, comprised of an 11 byte header, a 7 byte metadata, and a 110 byte payload. We
allocate 60% of the payload area (64 bytes) for actuation values while saving the rest for
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Figure 5.5: Temperature measurement before EKF and with 60% sensing packet drops.
other uses, e.g., periodic actuator compensation or calibration. In our study, we use float
data types for actuation values, which take 4 bytes per value. The 64 bytes buffer-size also
defines a bound for the allowable size of transmitted actuation values through wireless, i.e.,
8 pairs of u1 and u2.
Fig. 5.4 shows how the buffered actuation works in our design. With a buffer size of 8
elements, in time step 1, if there is no packet drop, the first value u(k) on the rightmost will
be used for actuation, replacing all the information in the buffer with the newly received
data. In step 2, if the actuation packet is lost, remaining values in the buffer, headed by
u(k+1), will be shifted right and u(k+1) will be used for actuation. This shifting and reuse
mechanism goes on whenever packets are dropped until all values are used. In the worse
case, after 8 consecutive packets are lost, the actuator will retain the value u(k + 7) until a
new actuation packet arrives.
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Figure 5.6: Temperature after EKF and with 60% sensing packet drops.
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Figure 5.7: Temperature measurement with 60% actuation packet drops.
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Figure 5.8: Zoomin View for Temperature measurement with 60% actuation packet drops.
5.4.4 Implementation of WSAN
Our WSAN uses the WirelessHART network protocol stack in WCPS 2.0. The Wire-
lessHART stack includes a multichannel TDMA MAC layer, a real-time transmission sched-
uler, and a routing layer supporting source routing and graph routing [46]. We have im-
plemented the asymmetric routing framework that allows any combinations of source and
graph routing strategies to be used for sensing and actuation.
The simulated WSAN employs the topology of 16 nodes from the WSAN testbed at Wash-
ington University [4]. The WSAN includes 16 nodes and has an average sensor-controller-
actuator distance of 4 hops. We collect the traces of received signal strengths and noise
from the testbed as inputs to the wireless simulations in TOSSIM, the standard simulator
of TinyOS with a realistic link model. To evaluate the wireless control systems under a
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Figure 5.9: Link Failure Ratio.
wide range of wireless conditions, we introduce offsets to the noise traces to simulate varying
levels of noise. By varying the offset in different experiments, we can simulate network con-
ditions ranging from normal conditions to stress tests with excessive packet drops. Fig. 5.9
shows link failure ratios under different average noise strength. The statistical distribu-
tions are based on all bidirectional links in the topology with 500 transmissions per link.
The lowest noise level (-82 dBm) results in a 15% link failure ratio, while the highest noise
level (-72 dBm) causes around 98% link failures, which represent extreme conditions such as
adversarial jamming attacks or extreme weather conditions.
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5.5 Case Study Results
In the following case study, we use the exothermic chemical reaction system introduced
earlier. The control goal is to reach a target temperature in Tank 2 (see Fig. 5.2). Pumps
on Reagent Tank 1 and Reagent Tank 2 are used as two actuators.
We will first test and compare the resilience of the state observer and actuation buffer to
packet drops. We will then explore the trade-off between source and graph routing in terms
of network performance and cost. Finally we will evaluate the performance of the integrated
wireless control system through holistic cyber-physical simulations.
5.5.1 EKF and Buffered Actuation Results
We tested our network under high stress conditions for the resilience and robustness of our
closed-loop implementation. Figs. 5.5 and 5.6 show the performance of the EKF when 60%
of the sensing packets are dropped. We observe the EKF does a very good job at filtering
out jitters caused by sensing packet drops. Fig. 5.7 shows closed-loop temperature control
results when 60% of the actuation packets are dropped, hence relying on the buffers to cover
for the lost data. In this case we see an obvious overshoot caused by actuation packet drops.
Zooming in Fig. 5.8 reveals an overshoot of over 2 ◦C, which is 10 times larger than the
overshoot with no packet drop. These results support our conjecture that actuation is more
vulnerable to packet drops than sensing.
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Figure 5.10: Sensing Delivery Ratio.
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Figure 5.11: Actuation Delivery Ratio.
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Figure 5.12: System Lifetime.
5.5.2 Network Results
To simplify our exposition, and follow the implementation described in Section ??, we will
denote abbreviate source routing as S and graph routing as G. Moreover, we will consistently
denote the sensing routing approach first and the actuation routing second. For example,
S/G corresponds to source routing for sensing and graph routing for actuation.
Fig. 5.10 shows sensing delivery ratio as a function of the noise strength. We observe that
delivery ratios of all routing approaches degrade as the strength of noise increases. G/G
and G/S consistently outperform the other approaches because of the redundancy offered by
graph routing. Note that -74 dBm noise has over 60% link failures in Fig. 5.9, yet we still
see G/G reaches nearly 60% multi-hop delivery ratios, which shows the strength of graph
routing in improving network reliabilities.
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Figure 5.13: Data Rates for the Actuator
Fig. 5.11 shows actuation delivery ratios. We observe similar trend as above, where S/G and
G/G achieve better delivery ratios than the rest.
Recall that graph routing needs more time slots because it allocates 3 slots for each packet,
whereas source routing only allocates 2 slots. For this reason we get an asymmetry in the
maximum frequency supported by each routing approach, where S/S and S/G support up
to 5 Hz flows, while G/S and G/G support up to 3 Hz flows.
Fig. 5.13 shows actuation data rates at the signal strength of -76 dBm, where nearly 40%
of the packets are dropped as shown in Fig. 5.9. S/S and S/G, which support up to 5 Hz
flows, clearly show higher data rates. Moreover, we observe that S/G and G/G have less
degradation due to the better reliability of graph routing in the actuation phase.
Fig. 5.12 shows the system lifetime performance of the network. In this simulation we include
two simulations for S/S and S/G, the first with flows at 5 Hz and the second with flows at
3 Hz, so we can compare the results across all routing approaches. We assume a general
battery capacity of 8640 J, which is the typical capacity of two AA batteries. We define
the system lifetime as the time to deplete the first node in the network. We observe that
the system lifetime of all routing approaches degrades as the noise level increase, due to
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Figure 5.14: Integral Absolute Error for Temperature Control with Noise Strength -74 dBm.
increasing retransmissions. S/S (3 Hz) has best system lifetime because it has the fewest
transmissions. We observe that the S/G (5 Hz) however has the worst system lifetime,
because we use graph routing for actuation and also because it runs at a higher frequency.
On the other hand, S/G (3 Hz) is the among the second best, which confirms the impact of
control frequency on system lifetime.
5.5.3 Control Results
To evaluate our control results we adopt two metrics: Integral Absolute Error (IAE) and
Maximum Absolute Error (MAE). IAE is the normalized time-average of the absolute error
between the closed-loop responses using wired control (i.e., no packet drops) and wireless
control. MAE is the maximum value of the same absolute error as above.
Fig. 5.14 shows the IAE for the control, i.e., regulating T2, with -74 dBm noise in the
network. The left plot shows control results running at 5 Hz using S/S and S/G, where
S/G has smaller error than S/S, as expected. The right plot show 3 Hz control with all four
routing approaches, where G/G outperforms the other approaches, also as expected. A cross
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Figure 5.15: Maximum Absolute Error for Temperature Control with Noise Strength = -74
dBm.
comparison between both plots reveals that S/G achieves the smallest IA error, since S/G
runs at a higher frequency than G/G and G/S, while it has better actuation reliability than
S/S. This is interesting as it clearly shows trade-offs between WSAN reliability and control
frequency.
Fig. 5.15 shows the MAE for the control goal. As in Fig. 5.14, we have 5 Hz results on the
left and 3 Hz on the right. We observe a similar trends as before, with S/G outperforming
the other approaches. This again shows the importance of taking advantage of appropriate
tradeoffs between wireless routing and control frequency.
With increasing attentions on cyber physical attacks, it would be interesting to see how our
design reacts in extremely challenging conditions. We next introduce results under harsher
noise conditions.
91
S/S S/G0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
IA
 E
rro
r (
°C
)
(a) 5Hz Control
S/S S/G G/G G/S0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b) 3Hz Control
Figure 5.16: Integral Absolute Error for Temperature Control with Noise Strength = -73
dBm.
5.5.4 Results under Harsh Wireless Conditions
In the following study, we further level up the noise in our simulation to -73 dBm. We note
-73 dBm features 85% median link failures as shown in Fig. 5.9. We observe around 35%
end-to-end delivery ratio for both sensing (Fig. 5.10) and actuation (Fig. 5.11).
Fig. 5.16 shows IAE errors of both 5Hz and 3Hz control. We note G/G and G/S can only
support up to 3Hz control and Fig. 5.16 represent their best achievable performance.
In Fig. 5.16, we see S/G (5Hz) behaves the best among both 5Hz and 3Hz methods. We
note the IAE error under -73dBm noise is 10 times larger than that in Fig. 5.14, which is
because the former has 35% delivery ratio while the latter has 60%. Among 3Hz control in
Fig. 5.16(b), we see G/G performs the best because it has better reliability for both sensing
and actuation. G/S in Fig. 5.16(b) has larger IA error than S/G, which again proves that
actuation data is more vulnerable to packet drops than sensing.
Fig. 5.17 shows the maximum absolute error with -73 dBm noise and around 65% data loss
ratio for both sensing and actuation. We see significantly challenges on the control result, as
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Figure 5.17: Maximum Absolute Error for Temperature Control with Noise Strength = -73
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the error reaches up to 2 ◦C in 5Hz control and 8 ◦C in 3Hz control. Given such challenging
wireless condition, 5Hz control with S/G in Fig. 5.17(a) achieves the smallest MA error at
a small variance. This again proves the value of asymmetric routing design in extremely
challenging wireless control cases.
5.6 Summary
This chapter explores the interactions of wireless routing and control through a cyber-
physical case study on a wireless process control system. Our case study integrates a network
control design and a realistic wireless mesh network based on the WirelessHART standard.
We observe the control system has different levels of resilience to packet loss for sensing
and actuation. We then propose the asymmetric routing approach where different routing
strategies can be selected for sensing and actuation. We further present a cyber-physical
co-design approach to tailor the routing strategies for sensing and actuation based on the
resiliency of control to packet loss. Holistic cyber-physical simulations show asymmetric
routing designed based on the cyber-physical co-design approach can effectively enhance the
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resiliency of wireless control systems under a wide range of wireless conditions. Our results
highlight the importance of co-joining the design of wireless network protocols and control
in wireless control systems.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Wireless sensor-actuator network (WSAN) technology is gaining rapid adoption in process
industries because of its advantages in lowering deployment and maintenance cost in chal-
lenging environments. While early success of industrial WSANs has been recognized, sig-
nificant potential remains in exploring WSANs as unified networks for full-scale industrial
plants. This thesis research explores a cyber-physical co-design approach for wireless con-
trol systems and presents four-fold contributions: (1) WCPS has been developed as the
first simulator that features both linear and nonlinear physical plant models, state-of-art
WirelessHART protocol stack, and realistic wireless network characteristics. (2) A realistic
wireless structural control study sheds light on the challenges of wireless structural control
and the limitations of a traditional structural control approach under realistic wireless condi-
tions. (3) Systematic case studies demonstrate that our emergency communication approach
enables effective emergency handling, while allowing regular control loops to share resources
in WSANs during normal operations. (4) An in-depth study of wireless routing and control
further highlights the importance of the co-design approach of wireless networks and control.
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